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SUMMARY 
In third-party litigation funding agreements, funders agree to finance a litigant’s 
litigation on condition that the funder will deduct a specified percentage from the capital 
awarded to the litigant in the event of success. In contingency fee agreements, such 
funding is provided by lawyers. Initially both these agreements were illegal in South 
Africa and England, but as civil courts became able to counter corruption and abuse –  
and with the recognition of the need to give more litigants access to justice – both were 
recognised as legal. Third-party litigation funding agreements by non-lawyers are 
unregulated in most jurisdictions. As the voluntary self-regulation in England is 
unsatisfactory, mandatory statutory regulation should be introduced in South Africa. 
The Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 caps the fee to 25% on the capital amount in 
South Africa. Since no such cap exists in Ontario (Canada), the cap of 25% in South 
Africa should be revised. 
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NKOMISO 
Eka Mintwanano yo nyika  nseketelo wa mali eka  nandzu wa thedi phati, vanyiki va 
mali  va  pfumela ku hakela mali ya nandzu wa  mumangali  hi xipimelo xa leswaku 
munyiki wa mali u ta susa phesenteji leyi kombisiweke ku suka eka mali leyi nyikiweke 
mumangali loko a humelela. Eka mintwanano ya tihakelo ta vukorhokeri, nseketelo  
walowo wa mali wu nyikiwa hi maloyara. Ekusunguleni mintwanano leyi hinkwayo a yi 
nga ri enawini eAfrika Dzonga na le England, kambe tanihi leswi tikhoto ta mfumo ti 
koteke ku kokela etlhelo eka timhaka ta vukungundzwana na nxaniso- na ku 
anakanyiwa ka xilaveko xo nyika vamangali votala mfikelelo wa vululami- hinkwayo yi 
anakanyiwile tanihi leyi nga enawini. Mintwanano yo nyika nseketelo wa mali eka  
nandzu wa thedi phati   hi vanhu lava nga riki maloyara a yi   lawuriwi eka vuavanyisi  
byotala. Tanihileswi vutilawuri byo tinyiketa eEngland byi nga riki kahle, mafambiselo 
ya nawu lama lavekaka ya fanele ya tivisiwa eAfrika Dzonga. Nawu wa Tihakelo ta 
Vukorhokeri wa 66 wa 1997 wu veka mpimo wa hakelo eka 25% eka xiphemu xa  
tsengo wa mali eAfrika Dzonga. Ku sukela loko ku ri hava mpimo lowu nga kona 
eOntario (Canada), mpimo wa 25% eAfrika Dzonga wu fanele wu langutisiwa hi 
vuntshwa. 
  
iii 
 
 
MANWELEDZO 
Kha thendelano dza ndambedzo dza mbilo ine ya itelwa muthu, vhabadeli vho tenda 
u badela mbilo ya muthu o no khou itelwa mbilo tenda mubadeli a tshi ḓo ṱusa 
phesenthe yo tiwaho kha tshelede yo avhelwaho muthu ane a khou itelwa mbilo arali 
a kunda. Kha thendelano dza mbadelo dzine dza badelwa musi ramilayo o no kunda 
kha mulandu, mbadelo idzo dzi ṋetshedzwa nga vhoramilayo. Mathomoni thendelano 
idzi vhuvhili hadzo dzo vha dzi siho mulayoni Afurika Tshipembe na England, fhedzi 
musi khothe dza mbilo dzi tshi vho thoma u hanedzana na tshanḓanguvhoni na u 
tambudzwa - na u dzhiela nṱha ṱhoḓea ya u ṋea vhathu vhane vha khou itelwa mbilo 
u swikelela vhulamukanyi –vhuvhili hadzo dzo dzhiwa sa dzi re mulayoni. Thendelano 
dza ndambedzo dza mbilo ine muthu a itelwa nga vhathu vhane vha sa vhe 
vhoramilayo a i langulwi kha vhulamukanyi vhunzhi. Samusi u langulwa ha ndaulo nga 
iwe muṋe hu ha u tou funa ngei England a zwi ṱanganedzwi, ndaulo ya 
khombekhombe ya mulayo i fanela u ḓivhadzwa Afurika Tshipembe. Mulayo wa 
Mbadelo dzine dza badelwa Ramilayo musi o kunda wa nomboro 66 wa 1997 mutengo 
wawo u guma kha 25% mutengo wa tshelede Afurika Tshipembe. Samusi tshikalo 
itsho tshi sa wanali ngei Ontario (Canada), tshikalo itsho tsha 25% Afurika Tshipembe 
tshi fanela u sedzuluswa hafhu. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Description or definition of agreements  
In this study third-party litigation funding agreements are defined as those agreements 
in terms of which a person (funder) other than a lawyer provides a litigant with funds 
to prosecute an action in return for a share of the proceeds of the action if the litigation 
is successful.1 In South Africa, the third-party litigation funding agreements concluded 
by lawyers are known as contingency fee agreements and governed by the 
Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (hereinafter “the Contingency Fees Act”). 
Contingency fee agreements are defined as agreements whereby a lawyer and his or 
her client agree on the payment of the legal fees only upon the achievement of success 
in the legal proceedings.2 A contingency fee agreement is thus a “no success, no fee” 
agreement.3  In England contingency fee agreements are called conditional fee 
agreements.4  
All third-party litigation funding agreements are prohibited by the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty. Maintenance is defined as “the procurement or 
assignment, by direct or indirect financial assistance of another person to institute, 
carry on or defend civil proceedings without lawful justification”.5 Champerty is defined 
as “the support of litigation by a stranger in return for a share of the proceeds of the 
action”.6 The research background provides a brief outline of the position of third-party 
litigation funding agreements and the contingency fee agreements and gives reasons 
for choosing England and Canada for comparison with South Africa.  
                                            
1  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc. v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) 66 
(Headnote). 
2   The South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v The Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (The Road Accident Fund Intervening) [2013] 2 All SA 96 (GNP) 98. 
3   S 2(1)(a) of the Contingency Fees Act. 
4  In terms of section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. 
5   Law Commission of England, Proposal for Reform of the Law Relating to Maintenance and 
Champerty (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966) para [9]. 
6  Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 176. 
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1.2  Brief historical background to the validity of third-party litigation funding 
agreements 
Third-party litigation funding agreements have been in existence for many years in 
South Africa. However, with a few exceptions the doctrines of maintenance and 
champerty prohibit these agreements on the grounds that they are against public 
policy. In South Africa, the enactment of the Contingency Fees Act resulted in the legal 
acceptance of some litigation funding agreements by legal practitioners. The problem 
with the Act is non-compliance by lawyers. Attorneys have been disregarding the 25% 
fee cap on the capital amount in the event of success of the litigation. This has led to 
many court decisions on the interpretation and calculation of the “success fee” or “uplift 
fee” which lawyers charge their clients on what they consider success or “partial 
success” in the contingency fee agreement. The Law Society of South Africa 
prescribes a format for lawyers when concluding contingency fee agreements with 
clients.  
In South Africa, lawyers commonly violate two provisions of the Act, namely sections 
2 and 4. Section 2 deals with the “uplift” or “success fee”, and section 4 deals with 
settlements where the court plays a role in overseeing the fairness of the agreement 
and deciding whether adequate information has been provided by the lawyer to the 
client. Attorneys rarely adhere to the provisions of the Contingency Fees Act although 
they are prescriptive.  
In South Africa there is no legislation governing third-party litigation funding 
agreements for non-lawyers. In Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc. v National Potato Co-
Operative Ltd7 the Supreme Court of Appeal watered down the prohibition of third-
party litigation funding agreements. The Price Waterhouse Coopers case was 
encouraged by the legislature’s regulation of contingency fee agreements through the 
Contingency Fees Act. There is relatively little literature on third-party litigation funding 
in South Africa, and as a result, the development of formal regulation has been 
staggered or even non-existent.. In most countries, it seems to be the commonly held 
argument that access to justice is reinforced if new forms of funding litigation are 
allowed to provide litigants with the possibility of pursuing their claims.8 In South Africa, 
                                            
7  2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) 66 (hereinafter Price Waterhouse Coopers). 
8   See e.g. Hurter 2011 CILSA 424.  
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the right to access to justice is enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1.3  Choice of legal systems for comparative research 
The reason for choosing English law as the appropriate legal system to compare with 
South Africa is that English law initially influenced the public policy of both third-party 
litigation funding agreements and contingency fee agreements in South Africa. The 
study investigates the English legal system in order to determine the feasibility of 
formal regulation of litigation funding agreements in South Africa. England is also the 
first common law country that permitted a self-regulated market for third-party litigation 
funding agreements.9 This is why English legal literature contains a larger number of 
authoritative texts on the subject of third-party litigation agreements. Even the 
Contingency Fees Act is based on English law.10  
However, English law will not be discussed for purposes of comparison with regard to 
contingency fee agreements, although the South African legislation in this field is partly 
based on English law. The discussion of English law will not contribute towards our 
understanding of the South African legislation, as there are few uncertain provisions 
in our legislation. The study will look at a country that applies contingency fee 
agreements differently to discuss alternative options in applying the Contingency Fees 
Act. The applicable contrasting country which is discussed on a comparative basis 
with regard to the application of the Contingency Fees Act and its shortcomings is 
Canada, more specifically the province of Ontario. The legislation in Ontario proposes 
a different approach to the conclusion of contingency fee agreements which will form 
the basis for a valuable comparative study with South African law. 
The reason for choosing the Canadian province of Ontario is that both this province 
and South Africa share the same developmental path with regard to the prohibition of 
contingency fee agreements. However, in contrast to South Africa, there is no 
mandatory cap on contingency fee agreements in Ontario, since the courts play a 
more active role in overseeing the validity of contingency fee agreements and their 
fairness. The research problem and the purpose of the study is to look at the question 
                                            
9  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report. 
10  Section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990. 
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of regulating third-party litigation funding agreements and extending the scope of the 
Contingency Fees Act. 
1.4  Research problem and purpose of study 
This comparative research looks at developments in and the consequences of third-
party litigation funding agreements as they affect litigants, lawyers and non-lawyers. 
The purpose of this study is threefold. Firstly, the study investigates the public policy 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty. The investigation covers the applicability of 
the doctrines with regard to third-party litigation funding agreements as it relates to the 
public policy principle of access to justice.  
Secondly, the study compares and investigates the manner in which third-party 
litigation funding agreements have developed in English law. The approach followed 
was to look into the effectiveness of their private regulation and the way the regulation 
has improved in English law. The position in English law is then compared with the 
South African regulation of third-party litigation funding agreements in order to improve 
the manner in which these agreements operate in South African law. The study also 
looks at the growth of third-party litigation funding within South Africa and the need for 
formal regulation. Upon completion of this investigation, recommendations are made 
on how third-party litigation funding agreements should be regulated. 
Thirdly, the study attempts to improve the regulation of contingency fee agreements 
in South Africa. This is done by investigating and comparing their regulation with that 
in the province of Ontario, Canada. The manner in which contingency fee agreements 
are regulated in Ontario, which is different from the manner in which they operate 
under South African law, will be outlined. The study thereafter incorporates these 
findings into recommendations on how the South African Contingency Fees Act 
governing contingency fee agreements could be improved. An outline of chapters is 
given below to make it easier to navigate through the dissertation. 
1.5 Outline of chapters 
The research consists of five chapters, the first chapter serving as an introduction. The 
second chapter deals with the English law perspective on third-party litigation funding 
agreements. The historical background of third-party litigation funding agreements is 
discussed. The discussion defines the two main doctrines that prohibit the 
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agreements, namely champerty and maintenance. The chapter also discusses recent 
case law which developed the mechanisms available to regulate third-party litigation 
funding agreements. This includes a discussion of the self-regulation of third-party 
litigation funding agreements by litigation funders and its shortcomings.   
The third chapter is the Ontario perspective on contingency fee agreements. This 
chapter discusses the development of contingency fee agreements in Ontario, 
Canada. It also discusses and defines the policy restrictions of champerty and 
maintenance. This is because the doctrines apply mutatis mutandis to contingency fee 
agreements as they do in third-party litigation funding agreements for non-lawyers. 
However, the discussion of the historical background in English common law is brief, 
as this part of the study is thoroughly discussed in chapter 2. The emphasis on this 
chapter is on the manner in which contingency fee agreements are effectively 
regulated in Ontario, Canada. 
The fourth chapter deals with the South African law perspective on third-party litigation 
funding agreements. This chapter discusses the development of both third-party 
litigation funding agreements and contingency fee agreements. The historical 
discussion includes briefly defining Roman and Roman-Dutch law’s pacta de quota 
litis. This section is brief because a thorough English common law historical 
background to the concepts of maintenance and champerty is discussed in chapter 2. 
The chapter further compares South African law with both English law on third-party 
litigation funding agreements for non-lawyers and Ontario law on contingency fee 
agreements. 
The fifth and last chapter includes recommendations and a conclusion. The chapter 
concludes on the findings from the English law perspective, the law perspective of 
Ontario, Canada, and the South African law perspective. This includes applicable 
reforms in South African litigation funding agreements for both non-lawyers and 
lawyers (contingency fee agreements). 
In the study, all the chapters that discuss a comparative legal system will start by 
discussing the historical background to each legal system. This includes the reasons 
for the outright restrictions on either third-party litigation funding agreements or 
contingency fee agreements, the developments of these agreements, policy changes, 
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and reforms that are yet to take effect with regard to these agreements. The main 
arguments for and against these agreements are discussed in each chapter together 
with the advantages and disadvantages of allowing third-party funders to provide 
financial support to litigants. 
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CHAPTER 2:  ENGLISH LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION 
FUNDING AGREEMENTS 
2.1  Introduction  
Third-party litigation funding agreements as discussed in this chapter are restricted to 
those agreements in terms of which a person (funder) other than a lawyer provides a 
litigant with funds to prosecute an action in return for a share of the proceeds of the 
action if the litigation is successful. In order to shed light on public policy on third-party 
litigation funding agreements, the chapter briefly discusses the historical background 
to litigation funding agreements in English law. The discussion includes the 
development of conditional funding generally,11 because there is a degree of 
intersection of the history of conditional fee agreements or contingency fee 
agreements and third-party litigation funding agreements. The competing public policy 
principles of prevention of the abuse of the administration of justice, the right to access 
justice and freedom of contract are discussed in order to strike a balance between 
them. 
The common law restrictions (champerty and maintenance) on third-party litigation 
funding agreements are briefly outlined, as they remain applicable in English law to 
some extent. This is followed by a discussion of the change in public policy regarding 
maintenance and champerty, which has been brought about mainly by judicial 
decisions. The advantages and disadvantages of these changes as discussed by 
commentators from different schools of thought are evaluated while investigating the 
current legal framework. The chapter further discusses appropriate reforms that would 
strengthen the current position of third-party litigation funding agreements in English 
law. This is followed by a conclusion.  
2.2  Traditional policy on third-party litigation funding in England: Maintenance 
and champerty  
In Fischer v Kamala Naicher12 the court decided that champerty and maintenance go 
against public policy and justice, tend to promote unnecessary litigation and are, in the 
legal sense, immoral.13 Since champerty and maintenance are contracts, it is prudent 
                                            
11   Frinson Civil Costs 1382. 
12   [1860] 8 Moo Ind App 170. 
13   Fischer v Kamala Naicher [1860] 8 Moo Ind App 170 187. 
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to consider that a contract is illegal for being contrary to public policy only if its harmful 
tendency is clear, that is, if injury to the public is its probable and not merely its possible 
consequence.14 Contracts tainted with maintenance and champerty are often held to 
be “void” or “unenforceable” by the courts unless they fall under one of the exceptions 
that will be discussed in this chapter.15 These contracts are perceived to be against 
public policy because they tend to hinder the proper administration of justice.16  
However, as Beale et al state, general public policy favours upholding contracts that 
have been freely entered into by contracting parties.17 Peel states, however, that a 
contract is against public policy and consequently illegal if the mere making of it is a 
legal wrong (it contravenes either the common law or statute).18 Maintenance and 
champerty were indeed previously crimes and torts for which damages were 
recoverable.19 Middleton and Rowley state that in determining whether a contract 
made with the involvement of a third-party is unenforceable the courts must look at the 
facts of each case.20 
These doctrines developed during England’s feudal past in order to combat abuses of 
the legal process resulting from third-party intervention in litigation of others.21 Lord 
Philimore explains the Champerty Act of 1275 and earlier statutes22 in Neville v 
London “Express” Newspaper Ltd23 by holding that: 
[A] perusal of these statutes shows that in the days when they were enacted the 
ordinary subject of the king found great difficulty in procuring a fair trial when his 
adversary was in some privileged position. Sometimes the king’s officers were induced 
by a bribe or by the offer of a share of the spoil to favour his adversary. Sometimes 
great men gave countenance to his adversary; sometimes confederacies were formed 
to support unjust claims or defences. And the statutes are directed against 
                                            
14   Fender v St John Midway [1938] AC 1 13. 
15   E.g Hutley v Hutley (1873) LR 8 QB 112; Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363; Bennet v 
Bennet [1952] 1 KB 123 136.  
16  Peel Contract 940. 
17   Beale et al Contract 940. 
18   Peel Contract 474. 
19  Frinson Civil Costs 469. 
20   Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 176.  
21   Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 235; see also Thomas 1981 Comm L World Rev 45. 
22  Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 70. 
23   [1919] AC 368. 
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maintenance, champerty and confederacy or conspiracy, while embracery or 
subornation of perjury were some of the means used to secure these unlawful ends.24 
Rabin states in his discussion of maintenance and champerty that:  
[L] egal justice consists in the right determination by a judge of a controversy between 
two litigants. Even in criminal law there is regularly an accuser and an accused, 
whether the accuser is there in a representative capacity or as a party injured. In the 
early history of law, there was a strong feeling not only that these three parties, the 
judge and two litigants were necessary but that there must be no one else and that 
anyone who intruded himself between the judge and the parties could only mean 
mischief.25 
It should be noted, however, that in mediaeval times the public policy against the 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty was initially not aimed specifically at the 
control of lawyers or the promotion of a code of legal ethics for them, as is the case in 
modern times.26 Initially lawyers were exempted from the provisions of the statutes 
prohibiting maintenance and champerty. The justification was that lawyers were not 
maintainers or champertors but that those who employed their services were tainted 
with the crime.27 The intended purpose of these statutes was to maintain the purity of 
the legal system, prevent speculation in litigation by third parties who were not directly 
involved in the litigation, and prevent abuse of the legal process.28 Rabin points out 
that it was easier for lawyers to commit such offences than for persons outside the 
judicial system.29 Under the next subheading, champerty will be discussed briefly as 
the first of the two doctrines prohibiting the abuse of the administration of justice that 
was prohibited by legislation and the courts.30 
2.2.1 Champerty  
The violation of the doctrine of champerty was regarded as more intolerable than 
maintenance.31 It is evident that from its inception the doctrine of champerty was 
intended to counter corruption and abuse in the English judicial system during feudal 
                                            
24   Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368, 427; confederacy or conspiracy means 
to conspire to forge and put in evidence at a trial; and embracery or subornation is defined as a 
favour by officers of the court: see Jackson 1882 Wash L Rep 369. 
25   Rabin 1935 Cal L Rev 48. 
26   Thomas 1981 Comm L World Rev 45. 
27   Rabin 1935 Cal L Rev 65; see also Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 59. 
28   For a discussion of these concerns and the history of champerty, see Rubin 2011 Cal Rev 48. 
29   Rabin 1935 Cal L Rev 65. 
30   Champerty Act of 1275; see also Hutley v Hutley (1873) LR 8 QB 112; Bennet v Bennet [1952] 1 
KB 123 136; Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363; Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 57. 
31   Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 HL 328. 
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times.32 Impecunious plaintiffs were more likely to enter into champertous agreements 
with their lawyers, who were often the less successful solicitors.33 Rabin mentioned 
that in rare situations it was possible that the crime of champerty might be committed 
on behalf of a defendant.34  
The effect of champertous contracts was that such agreements were unenforceable 
between the parties.35 However, the court in James v Kerr36 held that sums actually 
advanced to the champertor under the agreement were recoverable. The defendant 
could not use the champertous support of the plaintiff as a defence to the action and 
such defence afforded no ground for a stay of the proceedings.37 It is clear that the 
courts consistently disapproved of champertous agreements and were quick to strike 
down any agreement tainted by the crime of champerty.38 For example, Lord Denning 
in Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No.2)39 stated that:  
… [B]ut there is one species of maintenance for which the common law rarely admits 
of any just cause or excuse and that is champerty… the reason why the common law 
condemns champerty is because of the abuses to which it may give rise. The common 
law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted, for his personal gain, to 
inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses. These fears 
may be exaggerated; but, be that so or not, the law for centuries has declared 
champerty to be unlawful, and we cannot do otherwise than enforce the law. 
Towards the end of the feudal period, after corruption had decreased and the struggle 
between the crown and its feudal lords had subsided, the courts’ focus shifted from 
champerty to another concern.40 This concern was with the doctrine of maintenance 
where individuals with no interest in a suit would encourage and/or assist others in a 
court action. Such instances might lead to an increase in litigation resulting in a more 
litigious society.41 The doctrine of maintenance will be discussed below. 
                                            
32   The Statute of Westminster of 1275, which was the first statute to prohibit champerty in chapter 25 
and maintenance in chapter 28, supports this view. Eight statutes further followed the Statute of 
Westminster of 1275; see Winfield 1919 Law QR 59. The statutes were said to be simply 
declaratory of the common law; see Pechell v Watson (1841) 8 M & W 691, 700; Winfield 1919 L 
Q Rev 56. 
33   Rabin 1935 Cal L Rev 66. 
34   66. 
35   Hutley v Hutley (1873) LR 8 QB 112; see also Tolhurst Contract 191. 
36   (1888) 40 Chd 449; See also Carpenter v Boyce (1896) 22 VLR 248 253. 
37   Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363. 
38   Balachandran 1999 L Soc J 73. 
39   [1963] 1 Ch 199 219. 
40  Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 59. 
41   Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 59. 
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2.2.2 Maintenance 
Maintenance is the involvement of a third-party in litigation where the party does not 
stand to gain from the litigation and where the maintenance agreement is against 
public policy. The public policy principle against maintenance was established to 
protect the administration of justice. The decision in British Cash and Parcel 
Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd42 elaborated as follows: 
[I]t is directed against wanton and officious intermeddling with the disputes of others in 
which the maintainer has no interest whatever, and where the assistance he renders 
to one or other party is without justification or excuse. 
The involvement of a third-party without any interest in the litigation opened the door 
to the abuse of the legal process or the pursuit of justice.43 The argument was that the 
third-party involvement encouraged speculative litigation in cases without merit.44 This 
concern brought about distrust in cases financed by third parties.45 
Winfield also states that apart from the above, there might also have been a concern 
that maintainers with an interest in the legal proceedings had an incentive to pervert 
the judicial process.46 The doctrine of maintenance was developed during a time when 
litigation was increasingly encouraged by third parties. In support of this, Rabin states 
that this was one of the last manifestations of feudalism.47 
Initially, maintenance was considered to be the unlawful support of litigation by word, 
writing, countenance or deed.48 In the late eighteenth century, the law even went so 
far as to recognise that the volunteering of information in a lawsuit would suffice to 
constitute maintenance.49 Frinson claims, however, that today maintenance generally 
focuses on financial aid, such as funding or the provision of legal aid.50 The 
                                            
42  [1908] 1 KB 1006, 77 LJKB 649 CA 1014; see also Wallis v Duke of Porland (1797) 3 Ves 494; 
Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339, CA 342; Law Commission Maintenance and Champerty 
para [9]; Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 161; Tolhurst Contract 189. 
43  For a discussion of these concerns and the history of the law of champerty see Rabin Cal L Rev 
48; Winfield 1919 L Q Rev. 
44  Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 12. 
45  See further Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 12. 
46   59. 
47   Rabin 1935 Cal L Rev 65. 
48   Winfield 1919 L Q Rev 54. 
49   Master v Miller (1791) 4 Term Rep 320 340. 
50   Frinson Civil Costs 469. 
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assignment of a “bare cause of action” is considered unlawful,51 because it would allow 
a doubtful or fraudulent claim to be transferred to a person of influence or power, who 
(in a legal system that was still influenced by patronage) could then expect a 
sympathetic hearing in court proceedings.52  
Most forms of maintenance have been allowed since 1895 if the third-party has a 
legitimate interest in the outcome of the claim or if he had a reasonable belief that he 
had such an interest.53 The legitimate interest is not restricted to instances where the 
third-party maintains a claim for financial or commercial gain in the event of success 
in the litigation.54 It also extends to other circumstances where social, family or other 
ties justify the maintainer in supporting the litigation.55 The interest must, however, be 
distinct from any benefit, which arises under the contract since this is allegedly illegal 
as constituting maintenance.56 In Neville v London Express Newspaper Ltd,57 the court 
stated the following in respect of who could be considered to have a legitimate interest: 
[S]uch an interest is held to be possessed when in litigation a master assists his 
servant, or a servant his master, or help is given to an heir, or a near relative, or to a 
poor man out of charity, to maintain a right which he might otherwise lose.58 
                                            
51  The assignment of a bare cause of action is where the assignee has no real interest in the property 
that is the object of the assigned suit; all he or she wants from the lawsuit is to profit from the 
vindication of the assignor’s right; Sebok 2011 Vand L Rev 89. 
52   See Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 328; cited by Baroness Hale in Massai Aviation 
Services v Attorney-General [2007] UKPC 12 15. 
53   See Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339 CA; see also Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit 
Suisse [1982] AC 679 694; Bourne v Colodense Ltd [1985] ICR 291. 
54  See also Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 694; Bourne v Colodense 
Ltd [1985] ICR 291; Buday v Location of Missing Heirs Inc [1993] 16 O.R. (ed) 262; Giles v 
Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142; Circuit Systems Ltd & Basten v Zucken Redac (UK) Ltd (1995) 11 
Const LJ 201 209; Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 WLR 753; Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 
362; Thai Trading Co (a firm) v Taylor [1998] 3 All ER 65; Dal-Sterling Group Plc v WSP South & 
West Ltd [2002] Technology and Construction Law Reports 20; Dix v Towned [2008] APP. L.R. 
06/30. 
55   Thai Trading Co (a firm) v Taylor [1998] 3 All ER 65 69; see also Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 
406; Torlhurst Contract 192. 
56   Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 163. 
57   [1919] AC 368.  
58   389; Earlier before Neville in the case of Bradlaugh v Newdegate (1883) 11 QBD 11 Lord Coleridge   
CJ also spoke of ‘the interest which consanguinity or affinity to the suitor give to the man who aids 
him, or the interest arising from the connection of the parties, e.g. as master and servant’; See also 
Burke v Greene (1814) 2 Ball & B 517; Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 WLR 753 where the court held 
that it was not unlawful for a mother to provide funds to finance her bankrupt son’s action for 
defamation. 
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In other cases, litigation assistance was justified on the basis that the funder is 
financing the litigant as an act of charity,59 on the basis of religious ties,60 or when 
finance is provided by insurance companies defending claims,61 which includes body 
corporates.62 Financial institutions were also permitted to fund litigation where this is 
part of the service that they provide. A bank may thus offer a disbursement-funding 
loan, and a legal expenses insurer may fund the provision of legal services.63 In 
addition to the above exceptions to maintenance, the other exception was provided by 
the court in Circuit Systems Ltd & Basten v Zucken Redac (UK) Ltd.64 
The effect of maintenance is that such a contract is ordinarily held to be unenforceable 
between the contracting parties.65 It is not a defence to the action either.66 Before the 
amendment of sections 13 and 14(1) of the Criminal Law Act of 1967 which abolished 
the unlawfulness of both maintenance and champerty, the remedy of the other party 
to the litigation was an action in tort.67 In instances where there is a claim for 
maintenance, the position is that the court will not stay proceedings which are being 
maintained, provided the proceedings do not constitute an abuse of the process of the 
court, that is, where an action has been commenced in bad faith with no genuine belief 
in its merits but commenced for an ulterior purpose.68  
Tolhurst states that ever since the tort of maintenance was recognised by the courts, 
the successful party to the action could claim the costs from the maintainer if the other 
                                            
59   See Harris v Brisco (1886) 17 QBD 504; Jennings v Johnson (1873) LR 8 CP 425; Ram Coomar 
Coondoo and Another v Chunder Canto Mookrjee (1876) 2 APPCAS 186 210; Holden v Thompson 
[1907] BCLC 723 CA; Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295; Hamilton v Fayed [2001] EWHC QB 389; 
Dix v Townend [2008] APP. L.R. 06/30 para [29]. 
60  Rothewel v Pewer (1431) YB 9 Hen 6 64, pl 713.  
61  Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686 694-695; See also Bourne v Colodense Ltd [1985] ICR 291. 
62  See Scott v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1909) 25 TLR 789. 
63   See, for example; Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363 416; Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit 
Suisse [1980] QB 629 668. 
64   (1995) 11 Const LJ 201 209 (on appeal this point did not have to be decided: [1996] 3 All ER 748) 
held that despite the judgment of the court in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries 
Ltd [1982] Ch 204 a majority shareholder in a company possesses sufficient interest so that an 
assignment to him of the company’s cause of action is not against public policy (shareholder had 
standing to bring action where wrong to the company allegedly reduced the value of his shares). 
65   Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295 297.  
66   Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363. 
67   Champerty Act of 1275; see also Beale et at Contract 966. 
68   Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362; See also Martell v Consett Iron Ltd [1995] 1 Ch 363; 
Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295 297. 
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party to the action could not pay the costs.69 However, it was necessary to provide 
evidence for loss or damage resulting from the maintenance.70  
Maintenance and champerty can also affect solicitors although, a solicitor may conduct 
litigation despite having knowledge that his or her client has entered into a 
champertous agreement. The solicitor may not be able to recover costs if the solicitor 
actively participated in the agreement despite the fact that he or she is not a party to 
the agreement.71  
Public policy on the prohibition of champerty and maintenance has been transformed 
over the years.72 The transformation was necessitated by the fact that the prohibition 
of maintenance and champerty emerged in a society that was different from English 
society today, and reflected policy considerations that may no longer be relevant in 
today’s society.73 The section below will analyse the case law on public policy 
regarding access to justice and the protection of the administration of justice against 
abuse. 
2.3  Analysis of English case law 
There has been a gradual transformation of the public policy against maintenance and 
champerty and a more flexible approach has been introduced.74 This was reaffirmed 
in R (Factortame Limited and others) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions (no.8)75 where the court held that “because the question 
of whether maintenance and champerty can be justified is one of public policy, the law 
must be kept under review as public policy changes”.  
                                            
69   See Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363 375; Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686 694 and 
697; Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] 1 QB 629 663; Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 
142 164; Tolhurst Contract 191. 
70   Tolhurst Contract 191. 
71   See e.g. Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] 1 Ch 199; see also Yeo (2004) SAcLJ 86. 
72   See e.g. Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686 694 and 697; Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse 
[1982] AC 679 702; see also the Law Commission, Proposals for the Reform of the Law Relating 
to Maintenance and Champerty (1966) 3-4; Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 330 CA. 
73    Wenxiong (2014) Sing. J. Legal Stud. 383; see also Law Commission of England, Proposal for 
Reform of the Law Relating to Maintenance and Champerty (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1966) 
(hereinafter Law Commission of England 1966) 5. 
74   See for e.g. British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Services Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 
1006 1013; see also Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686 697. 
75   [2002] 3 WLR 1104 para [32]. 
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In Hill v Archbold76 the court also held that the trade union in the case had not been 
guilty of unlawful maintenance. The court further provided that maintenance is more 
readily accepted in the late modern period because most actions are now supported 
by third parties, including the state itself through legal aid with the proviso that if the 
action fails the third-party pays the costs of the other party.77 
In Giles v Thompson78 the court held that the doctrines of maintenance and champerty 
aim to protect the integrity of the justice system.79 It further held that the public policy 
against maintenance and champerty is not based on grounds of morality but on a 
desire to protect the administration of civil justice.80  Furthermore, the court held that 
it appears that the public policy change has influenced the court to take a liberal view 
of maintenance and champertous agreements, which were prohibited outright in the 
years preceding this judgment.81  
The rules against the doctrines of maintenance and champerty have been 
progressively relaxed by the courts, taking into account the public policy principle of 
access to justice and the prohibitive costs of litigation.82 In Thai Trading Corp v Taylor83 
the court held that: 
[T] he language and the policy which it describes are relevant of the ethos of an earlier 
age when litigation was regarded as an evil and recourse to law was discouraged. It 
rings oddly in our ears today when access to justice is regarded as a fundamental 
human right which ought to be readily available to all.84 
This is a further indication that the public policy rules against maintenance and 
champerty have become more tolerant of intervention by a third-party over time.85 This 
is because of the public policy consideration in favour of access to justice.86 Current 
jurisprudence has progressively redefined and narrowed the scope of all the instances 
                                            
76   [1968] 1 QB 686. 
77   Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 694. 
78   [1993] 3 All ER 321. 
79   Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 328. 
80   Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 332. 
81   Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 332; Balachandran 1999 L Soc J 74.  
82   Balachandran 1999 L Soc J 74.  
83   [1998] 3 All ER 65. 
84   Thai Trading Corp v Taylor [1998] 3 All ER 65 69.  
85  See Bergel and Edson v Wolf (2000) 50 OR 3rd 777 para [22]; see also Frinson Civil Costs 471; 
Tolhurst Contract 190. 
86   Frinson Civil Costs 471; see also Tolhurst Contract 190. 
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that prohibited access to justice by allowing additional litigation funding mechanisms 
to cope with the ever-changing public policy. The current position of third-party 
litigation funding agreements will be discussed below. 
2.4  The current position of third-party litigation funding agreements in England 
In 1966 third-party litigation funding was transformed through an amendment to the 
Criminal Law Act of 1967 (hereinafter the Criminal Law Act). Sections 1387 and 14(1)88 
abolished criminal and civil liability for both maintenance and champerty. However, 
section 14(2)89 retained the prohibition against maintenance and champerty where 
maintenance and champerty contracts were to be treated as being contrary to public 
policy or otherwise illegal. In interpreting section 14(2) of the Criminal Law Act the 
court in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse90 held that:  
[S] ection 14(2) further provided that these prohibitions should not affect any rule of law 
as to the cases in which a contract was to be treated as contrary to public policy or 
otherwise illegal. It therefore seems plain that parliament intended to leave the law as 
to the effect of maintenance and champerty upon contracts unaffected by the abolition 
of them as crimes and torts.91 
This was reinforced by the court in London & Regional (St George’s Court) Ltd v 
Ministry of Defence,92 where it was held that an agreement under which a third-party 
provided assistance to a party in litigation in return for a share of the proceeds was 
unenforceable on the basis of maintenance and champerty.93  
However, Liang argues that litigation funding agreements are in direct violation of the 
classic doctrines of maintenance and champerty since it is the claimant who voluntarily 
seeks assistance from the funder to fund his litigation in the first place.94 Liang also 
                                            
87   S 13(1): “The following offences are hereby abolished, that is to say- Any distinct offence under 
the common law in England and Wales of maintenance (including champerty)”. 
88   S 14(1): “No person shall, under the law of England and Wales be liable in tort for any conduct on 
account of its being maintenance or champerty as known to the common law, except in the case 
of a cause of action accruing before this section has effect”. 
89   S 14(2): “The abolition of criminal and civil liability under the law of England and Wales for 
maintenance and champerty shall not affect any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract 
is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal”. 
90   [1980] QB 629. 
91   Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629 670; see also Beale et al Contract 
16-049. 
92   [2008] EWHC 526 (TCC). 
93   London & Regional (St George’s Court) Ltd v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWHC 526 (TCC) para 
[103]. 
94   Liang 2014 Sing L Rev 184. 
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admits that third-party litigation funding agreements are less likely to be held 
unenforceable in English law unless there is some form of impropriety regarding 
them.95 In the current jurisprudence merely agreeing to finance litigation in return for 
a share of the proceeds is clearly not enough to constitute champerty. There should 
be some evidence of improper motive, whether it be to conduct malicious or vexatious 
litigation, cause a delay, abuse the process, or commit some other form of 
impropriety.96 
Liang fails to recognise that the laws regarding maintenance and champerty simply 
regulate the entrance of a third-party in litigation and are not concerned with whether 
the third-party was approached by the litigant or not. Further, Abrams and Chen state 
that third-party litigation funding provides financial support for litigation by an entity 
that is not a party to the litigation and has no direct interest in the outcome.97 This is 
therefore a direct violation of the doctrine of maintenance.98 However, it constitutes 
champerty as the third-party litigation funder will probably be entitled to a percentage 
of the claim should the litigant succeed.99 
Regarding the viewpoint expressed by Abrams and Chen, they seem to disregard the 
fact that maintenance, like champerty, is excusable in many cases today although the 
evil of champerty is the one that lurks in the corners of litigation funding more often 
than maintenance. It is important to look briefly into the emergence of third-party 
litigation funding agreements to better understand the rationale of their acceptance 
today. Before third-party litigation funding agreements came to be prevalent in 
England, the justifiable assistance an indigent could receive took the form of public 
funding or legal aid, which would amount to maintenance.  
The legal aid scheme in England was set up after the Second World War in terms of 
the welfare state.100 The Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949 introduced legal aid. It was, 
however, available only to those who met two criteria, namely the merit test and the 
                                            
95   Liang 2014 Sing L Rev 184; see also Buday v Location of Missing Heirs Inc [1993] 16 O.R. (ed) 
262. 
96   Buday v Location of Missing Heirs Inc [1993] 16 OR (ed) 262. 
97   Abrams and Chen 2013 U Pa J Bus L 1083. 
98   Abrams and Chen 2013 U Pa J Bus L 1083. 
99  See Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 HL 328; Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 176. 
100  Moorhead, Sherr and Paterson 2003 Law and Society Review 772. 
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means test.101 The 1949 Act was abolished by the Legal Aid Act of 1988, which 
introduced the Legal Aid Board. The Board was later abolished by the Access to 
Justice Act of 1999102 and replaced by the Legal Services Commission.103 Under the 
latter scheme, the general approach was that any civil legal matter would be eligible 
for legal aid if it was not one of the “excluded” matters listed in Schedule 2 to the 1999 
Act. Individual applications for legal aid funding were assessed by reference to a 
“Funding Code” which set out general principles on eligibility for legal aid.104  
In England, the Access to Justice Act of 1999 was enacted to further the scope 
conditional fee-based system.105 Regarding the public policy principle of access to 
justice, Moorhead states that conditional fee agreements in England were introduced 
as an extension of access to justice for clients who fall outside the scope of the legal 
aid scheme but are unable or unwilling to afford normal hourly fee arrangements.106 
All the agreements, which fall under the scope of conditional fees, are accepted by the 
courts as they provide litigants with the means to pursue meritorious cases that they 
would otherwise not have pursued had it not been for the public policy principle of 
access to justice upon this basis. 
In November 2008, Lord Jackson was tasked with conducting an independent review 
of costs and funding of civil litigation in England. His final report of December 2009 
contained recommendations on a wide variety of issues. Most of these 
recommendations were adopted by the government and eventually implemented by 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 (the LASPO Act), 
subordinate legislation and changes to the Civil Procedure Rules. The changes 
introduced through LASPO included the lifting of the ban on “damages based 
agreements” (hereinafter DBAs) which permit lawyers to claim a percentage of any 
eventual reward as payment for handling the case.107 These are equivalent to the 
American style “contingency fees”. LASPO introduced certain caps (25% in personal 
                                            
101   Which is now the test used by litigation funders to fund claims, as will be discussed below. 
102  Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 15. 
103  S 1 of the Access to Justice Act of 1999. 
104  S 8 of the Access to Justice Act of 1999. 
105   Chan Kok Yew 2004 Comm. L. World Rev 130. 
106  Moohead 1999 UBCLR 482. 
107  S 58AA (3) (a) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (amended by s 45 of LASPO); Damages-
Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/609). 
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injury cases, 35% in employment cases and 50% in all other cases) and other 
regulations setting out the terms under which DBAs may be used. These rules operate 
in conjunction with the mandatory regulatory and ethical obligations applicable to 
practising lawyers.108 
The Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs was published in 2012 and outlines the 
benefits of third-party funding. The majority of the contributors to the debate on the 
Costs Review found that third-party funding is beneficial and should be supported in 
principle. Lord Jackson’s recommendations concerning litigation funding were as 
follows:109 
I do not consider that full regulation of third-party funding is presently required. I do, 
however, make the following recommendations: 
a) A satisfactory voluntary code, to which all litigation funders subscribe, should be 
drawn up. This code should contain effective capital adequacy requirements and 
should place appropriate restrictions upon funders’ ability to withdraw support for 
ongoing litigation. 
b) The question whether there should be satisfactory regulation of third party funders 
by the Financial Services Authority (the “FSA”) ought to be revisited if and when the 
third-party funding market expands. 
c) Third party funders should potentially be liable for the full amount of adverse costs, 
subject to the discretion of the judge. 
These recommendations led to the creation of the Association of Litigation Funders 
and ultimately to the creation of the current voluntary Code of Conduct for Litigation 
Funders 2011 (as discussed in 2.6 below). Sir Rupert has commented that his 
concerns about litigation funding have been met by the terms of the adopted voluntary 
Code.110 
From April 2013 LASPO reversed the general approach to legal aid of the Access to 
Justice Act 1999: civil and criminal legal matters are now excluded from the scope of 
legal aid unless they are among the matters listed in Schedule 1 to LASPO. 
                                            
108  Reg 1(2) of the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/609). 
109   Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 124; see also Hodges, Peysner and Nurse 
Litigation Funding 124-143. 
110   See Jackson 2011 http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Sixth-
Lecture-by-Lord-Justice-Jackson-in-the-Civil-Litigation-Costs-Review-.pdf 4. 
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Section 38(1) of LASPO abolished the Legal Services Commission, which has now 
been replaced by the Legal Aid Agency.  
Many areas of civil111 and criminal112 proceedings were removed from the scope of 
legal aid following the reduction in public spending.113 LASPO is split into four parts. 
Part 1 replaced Part 1 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 as the statutory framework 
for legal aid in England and Wales, and implemented a series of substantial changes 
to the legal aid system. Sections 11 and 12 of LASPO provide guidelines on who 
qualifies for civil legal aid and sections 17 and 18 provide guidelines on who qualifies 
for criminal legal aid. 
In the case of litigants and legal practitioners the Solicitors Act of 1974114 initially 
prohibited an agreement whereby a solicitor stipulated for payment only if the case 
was successful. The practice of a solicitor’s receiving payment only after the case 
succeeded would also have been considered champertous. This was significantly 
altered after conditional fee agreements in England and Wales were first introduced 
by section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990. This marked a significant 
step in the introduction of conditional funding agreements generally.115 Section 58 of 
the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 was later amended by the Access to Justice 
Act of 1999.116  
The Access to Justice Act of 1999 extended the availability of alternative methods of 
funding litigation by authorising conditional fee agreements in all money claims except 
family and criminal law cases.117 Litigation funding by third parties (non-lawyers) is an 
unavoidable consequence of the above developments in funding litigation. The 
                                            
111  S 8 of LASPO. 
112  S 14 of LASPO. 
113  See also Cairns 2013 Probation Journal 186-187. 
114   S 59(2)(b); r 8 of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules 1990. 
115   Frinson Civil Costs 1383. 
116  S 27 of the Access to Justice Act of 1999. 
117   S 27 of the Access to Justice Act of 1999; see also Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright Contract 391-
392. 
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developments aim to resolve the problem of securing access to justice for those 
unable to afford their own litigation costs.118  
The most favoured funding method in England is before-the-event insurance policies 
(hereinafter BTE), followed by DBAs, conditional fee agreements (hereinafter CFAs) 
and commercial litigation funding (the latter being the subject of this study). The 
Jackson Costs Review, which the government has adopted, states that the policy 
should be that a “mixed economy” of different forms and sources of funding is 
required.119 It also observes that alternative ways of reducing expenditure, which 
effectively provide access to justice, are appropriate for resolving disputes and that 
the courts should be a last resort.120 The introduction of alternative modes of dispute 
resolution reverses the place of the courts from sole, or at least primary, arena for 
vindicating rights and delivering justice, to a long-stop role in the context of many 
claims being resolved in other forums, notably tribunals, public121 and private sector 
ombudsmen and other Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereinafter ADR) forums.122 
In 2002, the Court of Appeal clarified the law of champerty to permit private third 
parties other than solicitors to enter into agreements in which payment of their fees 
                                            
118   Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 15; see also Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai 
Merchant Marine Co Ltd (No.2) [2002] EWHC 2130; Gulf Azov Shipping Co Ltd v Chief Humphrey 
Irikefe Idisi [2004] EWCA Civ 292. 
119   Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 108. 
120    Mediation is enshrined as both a normal preliminary step before instituting a court claim, and as 
an integral part of English civil procedure: CPR Practice Direction—Pre-Action Conduct. At EU 
level, see Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. 
121   See a series of reports indicating an expansion of ombudsmen for citizen-state disputes in 
preference to litigation: Common Sense, Common Safety (The Young Review) October 2010; 
Complaints & Litigation: Health Select Committee proposals for Health Service Ombudsman 
reform, June 2011; Open Public Services, Cabinet Office White Paper July 2011; Public Services 
Ombudsmen Project Law Commission July 2011. See Buck, Kirkham and Thompson The 
Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (Ashgate 2010). 
122   See Empowering and Protecting Consumers: Consultation on institutional changes for provision 
of consumer information, advice, education, advocacy and enforcement (Department for Business 
Enterprise and Skills 2011). ADR in consumer disputes is set to take centre stage in replacing 
courts under recent EU proposals. Communication from the Commission: Consumer Solutions in 
the Single Market COM(2011) 791/2; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and the amendment of 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) 
COM(2011) 793/2; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR) COM(2011) 794/2. 
See also Hodges, Benöhr and Creutzfeldt-Banda Consumer ADR in Europe. 
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was conditional upon success.123 The court established that the mere fact that litigation 
services were provided in return for a share of the proceeds was not sufficient to justify 
a finding of unenforceability.124  
In this case an impoverished Spanish trawler owner had obtained judgment against 
the British Government for damages for breach of their fishing rights. Regrettably, they 
could not afford to proceed with the assessment of damages. The accountants they 
had employed, Grant Thornton, agreed to provide litigation support in the form of 
handling documents and programming services, as well as undertaking to pay the fees 
of expert witnesses, in exchange for 8% of any amount recovered.  
The Court of Appeal in addition to holding that the agreement was not champertous 
provided that: 
Where the law expressly restricts the circumstances in which agreements in support of 
litigation are lawful, this provides a powerful indication of the limits of public policy in 
analogous situations. Where this is not the case, then we believe one must today look 
at the facts of the particular case and consider whether those facts suggest that the 
agreement in question might tempt the allegedly champertous maintainer for his 
personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, to suborn witnesses or 
otherwise to undermine the ends of justice.125 
Therefore in any individual case it is necessary to look at the agreement in question in 
order to determine whether it tends to conflict with existing public policy that is directed 
at protecting the due administration of justice with particular regard to the interests of 
the defendant, Factortame.126 Furthermore, the court was of the view that Grant 
Thornton’s interest, as a substantial creditor of the claimants, did not help Grant 
Thornton’s case since that put Grant Thornton in a position to influence the outcome 
of the litigation.127 
The court bore in mind the fact that the share of the damages received by Grant 
Thornton was only 8%. This was a firm of accountants and therefore members of a 
respectable and regulated profession. While they did play an important role in the 
preparation of the computer model on which the damages claims were based, this was 
                                            
123  Factortame Ltd and others v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(No 2) [2002] 4 All ER 97 123 (hereinafter Factortame). 
124   Factortame 122. 
125   Factortame 108. 
126  Factortame 111. 
127  Factortame 120. 
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subject to checking by the other side and was therefore transparent. In any event, 
highly experienced solicitors and counsel represented the claimants and it was proper 
for the solicitors to insist on remaining in control of the litigation process. In these 
circumstances, there was no realistic prospect that justice would be undermined in 
any way by the 8% share of the proceeds in the agreement. It was also clear to the 
court that there was no other realistic way in which the accountants could be paid for 
work they had already done, other than by supporting the litigation in the manner they 
had chosen to do.128 
The court held that on the facts, litigation funding was necessary to allow access to 
justice, and therefore the funding agreement did not offend public policy. The court 
concluded that: 
They [the defendants] were faced with an extraordinarily complicated task in providing 
the damage that they had suffered and there was a real risk that lack of funds might 
result in their losing the fruits of their litigation. The 1998 agreements ensured that they 
continued to enjoy access to justice. They did this without putting justice in jeopardy. 
The 1998 agreements were not champertous. [my insertion]129 
This access to justice principle has also been applied in the context of insurance 
agreements. The case of Veronica Pirie v Mrs Doreen Violet Ayling130 provides some 
guidance. In that case, the court held that an agreement for the insurance premium to 
be 20% of any damages awarded was not champertous. This is because the insurance 
company relied not on the spoils but on the fruits of the litigation as a source from 
which the insured could satisfy her liability for the premium in return for the provision 
of genuine insurance coverage. The point to note here is that courts must have regard 
to whether there are elements of exploitation in a funding agreement where a particular 
litigation funder’s sole motive is to profit from it. The court held that: 
Whilst it is no doubt true that the greater the share of the spoils that the provider of 
legal services will receive the greater temptation to stray from the path of rectitude; in 
this case there is simply no opportunity for the insurer to act otherwise than as the risk 
bearer.131 
                                            
128   Factortame 121.  
129   Factortame 123. 
130   [2003] WL 21353355. 
131  Veronica Pirie v Mrs. Doreen Violet Ayling [2003] WL 21353355 Para [10]. 
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The reason for prohibiting champerty has always been to prevent the exploitation of 
the impecunious claimant, and the court must satisfy itself on the facts and 
circumstances of the case that such exploitation has not occurred, or otherwise 
declare such an agreement unlawful.132 It is apt to remember Lord Denning’s 
reasoning in Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2)133 where he cautioned that the reason why 
the common law condemns champerty is because of the abuses it may give rise to. 
For instance, the litigation funder might be tempted for his own personal gain to 
“inflame the damages, suppress evidence or even suborn witnesses”. 
 
2.4.1 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd134 
In 2005, the Court of Appeal confirmed the legality of litigation funding agreements, 
but this “was by way of what was not said rather than by way of an express ruling”.135 
The landmark case of Arkin136 furthered the gradual development of professional 
litigation funding. The case surveyed the many instances where funding agreements 
have been used and accepted over the years, and restated and established 
authoritative principles regarding the liability that funders may have for adverse costs 
in the event that the litigation they support fails. 
The court found that the accountability of a third-party litigation funder should not 
exceed the amount of his investment. The way the issue was approached by the court 
implied that litigation funding was desirable in some ways, but more importantly, it 
implied that it was lawful.137  
In Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd,138 a professional funding company entered into a 
funding agreement with the claimant. The funder MPC agreed to fund the employment 
of expert witnesses, the preparation of their evidence and the organisation of 
enormous quantities of documents, which it became necessary to investigate before 
the trial. When the claimant lost, the defendants applied for a costs order against MPC, 
the funder. The defendants emphasised the very substantial proportion of any 
                                            
132   Liang (2014) Sing L Rev 189. 
133   [1962] 3 WLR 955, 966. 
134   [2005] EWCA Civ 655 (hereinafter Arkin).  
135   Frinson Civil Costs 1384. 
136   Arkin 655. 
137   Frinson Civil Costs 1384. 
138  [2005] EWCA Civ 655 (hereinafter Arkin). 
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recoverable damages or settlement payments (25% of the first €5 million and 23% of 
any excess) which MPC was to receive under its funding agreement in the event of 
success.  
The amount of the claim including exemplary damages eventually reached 
€160 million. That would have meant a payment of some €40 million to the funders. 
The defendants also drew attention to the absence of any undertaking by MPC to pay 
the defendants’ recoverable costs or to take out after-the-event (ATE) insurance cover 
in respect of such costs. They submitted that, in principle, professional funders, as 
distinct from pure funders (such as family or friends who back a case without expecting 
any reward), who are maintaining litigation for their profit, should be liable for the 
defendants’ costs if their claim failed, which in this case it did. 
MPC argued that funding agreements with professional funders which have the 
purpose of enabling impecunious claimants to pursue claims of real substance which, 
but for such funding, they could not have pursued, should not be visited with costs 
orders against the funders if the claim fails.  
The High Court favoured MPC’s public policy arguments and refused to make an order 
of costs against the Part 20 defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a 
professional funder, who finances part of a claimant’s litigation costs, should 
potentially be held liable for the costs of the opposing party to the extent of the funding 
provided.139  
The court in this case managed to strike a compromise between the common law 
doctrine of champerty and the public benefit of increasing access to justice.140 The 
Court held that it was unjust for a funder who purchased a stake in an action for a 
commercial motive to be protected from all liability for the costs of the opposing party 
if the funded party failed in the action.141 This was a practical solution that neither 
denied a successful opponent all his costs nor deterred commercial funders from 
providing help to impecunious claimants seeking access to justice.  
                                            
139   Arkin para [41]. 
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141   Arkin para [38]; Liang 2014 Sing L Rev 193. 
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 Philips MR explained the benefits of litigation funding as follows:142 
 professional funders would be likely to cap the funds that they provide in order to 
limit their exposure to a reasonable amount; 
 this would have a beneficial effect in keeping costs proportionate; and 
 professional funders would also have to consider with even greater care whether 
the prospects of the litigation were sufficiently good to justify the support that they 
were being asked to give. 
If litigation funders bear the liability for the costs of a failed action, then it is arguable 
that there is less room for exploitation (and greater protection) for vulnerable 
claimants. Lord Phillips MR held as follows regarding the concern as to whether 
funders are liable for the costs of a failed action: 
We consider that a professional funder, who finances part of a claimant’s costs of 
litigation, should be potentially liable for the costs of the opposing party to the extent of 
the funding provided. The effect of this will, of course, be that, if the funding is provided 
on a contingency basis of recovery, the funder will require, as the price of the funding, 
a greater share of the recovery should the claim succeed. In the individual case, the 
net recovery of a successful claimant will be diminished. While this is unfortunate, it 
seems to us that it is a cost that the impecunious claimant can reasonably be expected 
to bear. Overall justice will be better served that leaving the defendants in a position 
where they have no right to recover any costs from a professional funder whose 
intervention has permitted the continuation of a claim which has ultimately proved to 
be without merit.143 
Therefore, a litigation funder is liable for the liabilities and costs involved in any failed 
litigation proceedings to the extent of the funding provided. Furthermore, he has an 
obligation to provide assistance designed to ensure that those who are involved in 
litigation have the benefit of proper legal representation, as the court held in Gulf Azov 
Shipping Co Ltd v Chief Humphrey Irikefe Idisi.144  
Such a compromise has significant drawbacks, as was rightly pointed out in Arkin. 
Firstly, it would mean that the litigation funder would probably demand a greater share 
of the proceeds should the claim succeed, since he bears liability for the costs of 
funding the litigation. Secondly, litigation funders would be more careful in selecting 
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whom to fund, and would probably only select those cases which they felt would 
succeed in court. This suggests that access to justice may not necessarily be 
increased, since it all boils down to the litigation funder’s “cherry picking”. In the light 
of this, can such a compromise really lead to an increased access to justice? 
Nevertheless, it may still be contended that litigation funders will only choose to fund 
meritorious cases, thus ensuring that the courts are not bogged down with 
unmeritorious claims.145 It is surely in the public interest to ensure that people who 
have meritorious claims have their day in court.146 The case of Arkin has been 
approved by cases in other jurisdictions, key of which is the South African High Court 
decision in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd.147 The following case 
demonstrates the steps taken by the courts in evaluating the legal implications of 
litigation funding. 
2.4.2  London & Regional (St George’s Court) Ltd v Ministry of Defence148  
In this case, Coulson J summarised the views of the then applicable English law 
authorities as follows:149 
 the mere fact that litigation services have been provided in return for a promise 
of a share of the proceeds is not in itself sufficient to justify that promise being 
held to be unenforceable;150 
 in considering whether an agreement is unlawful on grounds of maintenance or 
champerty, the question is whether the agreement has a tendency to corrupt 
public justice, and as such the question requires close attention to the nature and 
surrounding circumstances of the particular agreement;151 
 the modern authorities demonstrate a flexible approach where courts have 
generally declined to hold that an agreement under which a party provided 
                                            
145   Liang (2014) Sing L Rev 194. 
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148   [2008] EWHC 526 (TCC) 121 ConLR 26 152 Sol Jo (no 14) 28. 
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assistance with litigation in return for a share of the proceeds was 
unenforceable;152 
 the rules against champerty, so far as they have survived, are primarily 
concerned with the protection of the integrity of the litigation process by the 
limitation of control of the conduct of the action by a third party.153 
The cases referred to above deal with the current regime of third-party litigation 
funding and its evolving public policy concerns. The funding contract is incorporated 
in an instrument known as the litigation funding agreement, which will be dealt with 
below together with the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders as measures that 
regulate the controversial third-party litigation funding arrangements. 
2.5  The Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders and the Funding Agreement 
Principles 
Currently, third-party litigation funding agreements in England (unlike conditional fee 
agreements) are not regulated by statute. There is, however, a voluntary Code of self-
regulation as proposed by the Jackson report,154 as well as the Code of Conduct,155 
which is implemented by the Association of Litigation Funders together with the Civil 
Justice Council (hereinafter CJC). Seven funders currently subscribe to this code at 
the time of writing of this dissertation.156 
In November 2011, the Association of Litigation Funders,157 a private company limited 
by guarantee and owned and directed by its member firms, was formed as a forum for 
funders and non-funders alike to discuss matters relating to funding and provide a 
contact point for those using funding.158 It administers a self-regulating Code of 
Conduct. In 2015, the Association of Litigation Funders consisted of seven member 
                                            
152   See Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai (Merchant) Marine Co Ltd (No.2) [2002] Loyd’s Rep 692 
(hereinafter Papera 692). 
153   See Papera 692. 
154  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report. 
155  Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders 2016 (hereinafter the Code of Conduct). 
156  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report ch 9 para 1.2. 
157   Association of Litigation Funders date unknown http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/. 
158   Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 180. 
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firms. This membership represents less than one-third of the 25 funders estimated by 
Lord Beecham to have been operating in England in 2013.159  
In addition to administering the Code of Conduct, the Association of Litigation Funders 
acts as an advocacy organisation which “actively engages with government, 
legislators, regulators and other policy makers to  shape the regulatory environment 
for litigation funding in England”.160 Members of the Association of Litigation Funders 
market their membership of the organisation, urging claimants and their lawyers “to 
work only with those funders who are approved members of Association of Litigation 
Funders”.161 The Association is responsible for future development of the Code of 
Conduct. The Code of Conduct sets out the standards of best practice and behaviour 
for litigation funders in England. It also provides transparency to claimants and their 
solicitors and requires litigation funders to provide satisfactory answers to certain key 
questions before entering into a written third-party litigation funding agreements.162  
The Association of Litigation Funders’ Code of Conduct does not impose any 
disclosure requirements on the court or opposing parties.163 If a complaint against a 
member for violating the Code of Conduct is found to be meritorious under the 
Association’s complaints procedure, the maximum fine is £500, payable to the 
Association.164 A further potential penalty for noncompliance is termination of 
membership, at the discretion of the organisation’s directors, who are representatives 
of the funder members. Termination of membership does not prohibit the funder from 
continuing to fund claims, and many active funders choose not to be members at all. 
Under the Code of Conduct, litigation funders are required to give assurances to 
claimants that, among other things, the litigation funder will not try to take control of 
                                            
159    Justice not profit 2015 http://www.justicenotprofit.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Final-TPLF-
Paper.pdf. 
160   Justice not profit 2015 http://www.justicenotprofit.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Final-TPLF-
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Paper.pdf7. 
162   Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 180. 
163  Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 124. 
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the litigation, has the means to pay for the costs of the litigation and will not terminate 
the funding agreement unless there is a material adverse development.165 
The Code of Conduct was initially recommended and ultimately approved by Lord 
Jackson and commended by Lord Neuberger.166 The Code further states that a funder 
will take reasonable steps to ensure that the litigant has received independent advice 
on the terms of the litigation funding agreement.167 It also provides that a funder will 
not seek to influence the litigant’s solicitor or barrister to cede control of the dispute to 
the funder.168 Frinson states that this provision is impractical;169 however, fears that 
the involvement of funders may be seen as champertous have generally stopped 
funders from exercising any significant control over funded litigation.170 
In a litigation funding agreement a funder covers all the costs of the litigation (or such 
costs as the funded party seeks to have covered by the funder) in return for a share 
of the proceeds of the action, including its own legal costs, experts’ fees and court fees 
and any adverse costs.171 
Contractual provisions of the litigation funding agreement are drafted only by funding 
specialists and here the following general points can be made: 
 The agreement ought to be drafted by a drafter who had sight of the draft 
contracts of retainer and the ATE policies.172 The drafter should be asked to 
ensure that there are no conflicts. It is good practice to include a provision that 
stipulates which document will take precedence in the event of conflict.173 
 It is considered good practice to include a reporting provision which states in 
specific terms what reports the legal representative must provide to the funder. 
                                            
165   Clauses 9.3 and 11.2 of the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders 2016. 
166   Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 181. 
167   Clause 9.1 of the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders 2016. 
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Such a provision should not require a level of reporting that might lead to 
allegations of “wanton and officious intermeddling” and champerty.174 
 The Code of Conduct also states that agreements should stipulate whether (and 
if so how) the funder may provide input into the litigant’s decisions in relation to 
settlements.175 It is also considered good practice to set out, in terms, what the 
funder cannot do (in other words, to limit the funder’s influence so that he cannot 
be accused of controlling the litigation).176  
 With regard to termination of the contract, the Code of Conduct states that the 
agreement might be terminated where the Funder or Funder’s Subsidiary or 
Associated Entity reasonably ceases to be satisfied with the prospects of the 
dispute, where the dispute is no longer commercially viable, or where there has 
been a material breach of the agreement by the litigant.177  
 It is considered necessary to include within an agreement or a schedule to such 
an agreement a record of priorities (often referred to as “the waterfall of 
priorities”).178 Where other stakeholders are involved such as ATE insurers, a 
priorities agreement would be appropriate. Paying attention to these issues will 
reduce the possibility of disputes.179 
 In the event of a dispute between the litigant and the funder regarding settlement 
or termination of the agreement, the Code provides that a binding opinion shall 
be obtained from a Queen’s Counsel who shall be instructed jointly or nominated 
by the Chairman of the Bar Council.180 Furthermore, it is considered good 
                                            
174   Frinson Civil Costs 1392. 
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176   Frinson Civil Costs 1392. 
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practice to ensure that both the funder and the litigant are fully aware of this fact 
before the agreement is made.181 
 The Code of Conduct also states that agreements should state whether the 
funder will (i) meet any liability for adverse costs, (ii) pay any premium including 
insurance premium tax, to obtain costs insurance, (iii) provide security for costs, 
or (iv) meet any other financial liability. It is considered convenient to set these 
details out in a schedule to the agreement. Unless the entire risk is borne by the 
ATE insurer, there should also be a record of who pays what and in what 
circumstances (who is responsible for adverse costs orders, who pays for top-up 
insurance, etcetera). 
There is no need for a CFA in a funding agreement; however, the availability of one is 
advisable where the solicitors are prepared to act on at least a partial conditional fee 
agreement as a demonstration of their faith in the merits of the case.182 There is also 
no need for ATE insurance although it can be used to limit the funder’s risk of an Arkin 
payment by spreading it to multiple stakeholders. The remuneration is typically 20%-
50% of the amount recovered in either litigation or settlement.183 The agreement ought 
to place a limitation on control by the funder for it not to be regarded as champertous. 
The funding agreement should be structured in such a way that the litigant retains full 
control over the way in which it conducts its action (this includes the funder’s not being 
permitted to set minimum settlement levels when signing up a case, or interfering in 
the everyday conduct of the matter).184 Upon signature of the agreement the litigant is 
left to run his litigation in the usual way. The funding agreement sets out in clear terms 
the responsibilities and liabilities of the parties.185 Despite the benefits of third-party 
litigation funding in furthering the policy on access to justice, this type of litigation 
funding has both advantages and disadvantages and they will be critically evaluated 
below. 
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2.6 Critical evaluation of third-party litigation funding in practice 
2.6.1 Advantages of third-party litigation funding 
Middleton and Rowley list the main advantages of third-party funding as follows: 
 Third-party funding facilitates access to justice by enabling the pursuit of 
meritorious claims that might not have been pursued by litigants. 
 Third-party funding also facilitates the involvement of law firms that were 
previously reluctant to take on cases on a “no win, no fee” basis. 
 Commercial funders screen cases carefully to prevent unmeritorious claims and 
a due diligence is usually conducted.  
 Funders are often actively involved in the litigation in an attempt to settle the 
proceedings. Here their legal and commercial experience can prove an 
advantage.   
 Third-party funding provides an additional way of funding litigation and for some 
parties it is the only means of litigation funding.  
 Although a successful claimant with third-party funding foregoes a percentage of 
his damages, it is better for him to recover a substantial part of his damages than 
to recover nothing at all. 
 The use of third-party funding (unlike the use of conditional fee agreements or 
contingency fee arrangements) does not impose additional financial burdens 
upon opposing parties. 
 Third-party funding tends to filter out unmeritorious cases, because funders will 
not take on the risk of such cases. This benefits opposing parties. 
 Finally, third-party funding is in the economic interest of the defendant as it 
ensures that adverse costs orders payable by the plaintiff are satisfied. 
Funders are in favour of the litigation funding agreement in English law as a tool that 
plays an important role in encouraging advocate remuneration through conditional fee 
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agreements.186 Third-party funding offers corporate clients the opportunity to move the 
financial risk and cost of litigation off their balance sheets.187 Law firms are given the 
opportunity to take on big, complex cases using capital from third parties instead of 
having to bear the burden of ethical challenges inherent in funding litigation 
themselves.188  
Lord Jackson comments as follows on the future of litigation funding:189 
There is likely to be a greater role for litigation funders, if CFA success fees cease to 
be recoverable… I express the hope that in the future litigation funders will be able to 
support a [wider] range of litigation than at present, including group actions and claims 
of lower value. [my comment] 
These developments have resulted in discussions between litigation funders and 
bigger firms of solicitors aimed at providing facilities to fund group litigation and lower-
value claims.190 The relevance of the latter is that it should not be assumed that 
litigation funding is necessarily unethical and is relevant only to those who practise 
commercial litigation.191 It is entirely credible that in the very near future it will be 
available in personal injury litigation as well.192 
An example of a recent well-known case in which third-party funding appeared to 
operate satisfactorily is Stone & Rolls Ltd (in Liquidation) v Moore Stephens.193 The 
claimant company brought a substantial claim for professional negligence against its 
former auditors, with the benefit of third-party funding. The Court of Appeal, reversing 
Langley J, held that on the alleged facts the auditors could raise the defence of ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio and accordingly struck out the claim.194 The House of Lords 
dismissed the claimant’s appeal. According to press reports, the funder, which had 
stood to receive some 40% of the proceeds if the action succeeded, duly accepted 
liability for the auditors’ costs. Those costs were reported as being in the region of 
                                            
186   Financier Worldwide 2012 http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/. 
187   Financier Worldwide 2012 http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/. 
188   Financier Worldwide 2012 http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/. 
189   Jackson 2011 http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Sixth-
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190   Frinson Civil Costs 1412. 
191   Frinson Civil Costs 1412. 
192   Frinson Civil Costs 1412. 
193   [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 3 WLR 455. 
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£2.5 million. It was also reported that there was no after-the-event (“ATE”) insurance. 
In an interview with the Law Society Gazette following the House of Lords decision, a 
legal director of the funder said that the funder currently had a portfolio of 10 to 12 
ongoing cases with a success rate of 80%. These facts illustrate that third-party 
funders can operate satisfactorily in the absence of ATE insurance and that they can 
accept liability for any adverse costs orders. The risk assumed by the funder is 
reflected in the percentage of damages which the funder is entitled to receive in the 
event of success. 
In their publication, Fullbrook Capital Management LLC (a litigation funder) states that 
investors see litigation as an innovative, untapped asset class with great potential.195 
Fullbrook argues that there is also greater transparency in the industry now, and that 
more industry data are being published and analysed, while new products and 
services are being offered by the industry.196 However, this could also be a 
disadvantage because without regulation the products and services could be 
detrimental to the litigants.197 This proves that the system that regulates third-party 
litigation funding agreements in England require improvements. The legislature and/or 
the Association of Litigation Funders as the administrator of the current Code of 
Conduct should look into the disadvantages of the current regulation. In doing so, the 
legislature should consider reforming the industry to meet current demands.  
In conclusion, third-party litigation funding has evolved to increase the affordability of 
access to justice for some litigants. Litigation funding agreements provide access to 
justice for those unable to enter the courtroom due to financial constraints. The 
advantages highlighted above show that through these funding mechanisms the public 
policy principle of access to justice is of paramount importance and that other 
jurisdictions would do well to consider the route taken by England. The disadvantages 
associated with third-party litigation funding agreements are discussed below. 
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2.6.2 Disadvantages of third-party litigation funding 
Firstly, it is one of the unfortunate truths that litigation funding by a third party is 
currently not available to everyone and is not available for every form of litigation in 
England. The minimum size of claims that litigation funders are prepared to fund 
ranges from £350,000 to £25,000,000.198 Thus the damages suffered need to be 
sufficient to make the time and costs involved in considering and instituting the claim 
worthwhile. In addition to value, the minimum eligibility criteria for considering funding 
a claim are:199 
 a defendant who is able to pay the amount claimed; 
 good legal merits in relation to both liability and a demonstrable minimum claim 
value; 
 the costs of pursuing the matter are proportionate to the size of the claim; and 
 the lawyer employed to prosecute the claim for the client is experienced in the 
area to which the claim relates. 
Third-party funding is not usually possible where non-monetary relief, such as an 
injunction or declaration, is the main remedy sought.200 The funding arrangement is, 
however, widely available in commercial litigation.201 In his initial report, Lord Jackson 
found that third-party litigation funding was commonly used to fund insolvency 
cases.202 Litigation funding is becoming more prevalent in professional 
negligence203 and group class actions.204 With regard to personal injury cases, the 
Solicitors’ Code of Conduct prohibits the use of third-party litigation funding.205 Third-
                                            
198   Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report 161; see also Middleton and Rowley 
Civil Costs 180. 
199  Middleton and Rowley Civil Costs 180. 
200   Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 118. 
201  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 119. 
202  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report 162. 
203   See, Stone & Rolls Ltd (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens [2009] UKHL 39. That claim was 
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204  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report 162-163. 
205   Rule 9.01(4) of the Solicitors' Code of Conduct 2007 prohibited a solicitor, in any personal injury 
claim, from acting in association with inter alia any person whose business was to support claims 
and who in the course of such business received contingency fees. This was replaced by 
'outcomes-focused regulation' in the Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct 2011.  
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party litigation funding is not used in certain other types of litigation either for reasons 
that include the perceived low rate of return (such as in small business disputes), the 
technical and legal complexity (such as in intellectual property or construction 
disputes), or the unpredictability of the outcome (such as in defamation actions).206  
Secondly, the litigation funding market includes a number of big funders, some of 
whom are members of the Association of Litigation Funders, as well as a number of 
smaller funders who have elected not to join the Association. Two of the biggest 
funders operating in England, Burford Capital and Juridica Investments, are public 
companies on AIM – the London Stock Exchange’s international market “for smaller, 
growing companies” – and publish annual reports.207 These companies have 
operations in the United States (hereinafter the US) as well. In its report the US 
Chamber of Commerce refers to the decision of Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas 
Keystone,208 in which the English Commercial Court dismissed what were described 
by Lord Justice Christopher Clarke as “a range of bad, artificial or misconceived 
claims” with a “grossly exaggerated” quantum of US $1.65 billion in September 
2016.209 Three funders, two of which were US companies, supported the litigation and 
the third was a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. None of the companies 
was a member of the Association of Litigation Funders and there were doubts over 
whether one of them was even still in existence at the time the judgment was handed 
down.210 In the report, the US Chamber of Commerce states that Argentum Capital 
had left the Association of Litigation Funders in 2014 amid concerns about the source 
of its capital.211 The Channel Islands Securities Exchange also delisted Argentum 
Capital.212 Its main investor was reported to be Centaur Litigation, which was 
reportedly under investigation by the Hong Kong authorities following allegations by 
Brendan Terrill, the owner of Buttonwood Legal Capital Limited, that some of its capital 
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originated from a Ponzi scheme.213 These developments demonstrate that the 
existence of the Association of Litigation Funders does not necessarily prevent less 
reputable funders from entering the market, particularly as the market grows and more 
funders are competing for more cases that are speculative.214 
In the third place, Beisner and Gary state that third-party litigation funding may lead to 
an increase in the filing of questionable claims.215 They observe that funding 
companies are mere investors and they base their funding decisions on the present 
value of their expected return, of which the likelihood of success at the trial is only one 
component.216 In addition, funding providers can mitigate their downside risk by 
spreading the risk of any particular case over their entire portfolio of cases and by 
spreading the risk among their investors.217 Another consideration is that, as Rubin 
states, funding providers can be expected to have higher risk appetites than most 
contingency-fee attorneys and may be more willing to back claims of questionable 
merit.218 This problem is not addressed in the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders. 
The propensity to take portfolios of cases (including low and high risk cases), and the 
likelihood of such cases being packaged and securitised, also adds or will continue to 
add to the overall volume of more speculative cases being brought before the 
courts.219 For defendants, this means an increase in the volume of litigation that must 
be defended, which has its own cost to the economy.220 Even though cost shifting rules 
prevent overly speculative litigation, funders are protected under English costs 
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rules.221 They are only liable up to the amount they invested, regardless of the expense 
they have caused a defendant by bringing a meritless claim.222 
Fourthly, Beisner and Gary argue that litigation funding changes the traditional 
dynamic as an investor is involved in the plaintiff’s lawsuit. The funder company will 
probably want to protect its investment and there is usually an expectation that the 
investor may try to exert control over the plaintiff’s strategic decisions.223 The plaintiff’s 
lawyer, as the person receiving payment from the investor and possibly even having 
been retained by the investor, may accede to those efforts.224 Even when the funding 
provider’s efforts to control a plaintiff’s case are not overt, the existence of the funding 
provider naturally subordinates the plaintiff’s own interests in the resolution of the 
litigation to the interests of the third party investor.225 Raymond also argues that the 
lawsuit-investment industry makes no secret of its interest in protecting litigation 
investments by influencing cases. A principal of the investor Black Robe Capital 
Partners LLC was quoted as saying his firm would play a “pro-active role in 
lawsuits”.226 A former Burford chairperson said that his new investment company 
would not “control” litigation but would “do more than was done before”.227 Beisner and 
Gary further observe that third party funders prolong litigation by deterring 
settlement.228 A plaintiff who has to pay a third party litigation investor out of the 
proceeds of any recovery can be expected to reject what may otherwise be a fair 
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settlement offer, hoping for a larger sum of money.229 The law or Code of Conduct for 
Litigation Funders does not address this matter of control adequately. 
In the fifth place, Beisner and Gary indicate that third-party litigation funding 
investments compromise the lawyer-client relationship and diminish the professional 
independence of lawyers by inserting a new party into the litigation equation whose 
sole interest is making a profit on its investment.230 In the light of this the US Chamber 
of Commerce states that despite litigation funders’ financial success and the steep 
growth of the industry, the manner in which third-party litigation funding in England 
and around the world has developed appears to present some risks and the industry 
is not without its critics.231 It further states that high-profile setbacks in certain cases232 
have demonstrated certain shortcomings, including the inadequacy of self-regulation 
in preventing some abuses.233 
For this reason, funders may have an incentive to take a speculative case and press 
for a settlement, knowing that even if they lose, the defendants rarely recover the 
actual costs of the defence (as opposed to the court-awarded costs). In many cases, 
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this can force defendants to settle while giving the funders the advantage of a capped 
risk.234 
Finally, as more cases are taken on behalf of smaller and less sophisticated claimants 
(including consumers), there is a greater risk that funders may exercise control and 
potentially direct the litigation for their own benefit, as opposed to the benefit of the 
claimants, giving rise to conflicts of interest.235 The concerns regarding third-party 
funding may be summarised as follows: increased litigation, encouragement of 
frivolous claims and the potential to corrupt the arbitral or judicial process by a person 
who is not connected with the merits of the dispute and has a profit motive. Some 
concerns relate to unfair contract terms, the need for disclosure and conflicts of 
interest. There is also a threat to corrupt the lawyer-client relationship through third-
party funding. Some of the disadvantages make litigation funding in England less 
attractive to other jurisdictions that are willing to adopt the self-regulation of third-party 
litigation funding. Parallel to these disadvantages, some advantages are attractive to 
other jurisdictions. The options for reform regarding third-party litigation funding in 
England will be discussed below. 
2.7  Options for reform in England 
The voluntary Code of Conduct regulates most of the litigation funding investments in 
England and it seems to be an appropriate regulatory scheme considering the growth 
of the litigation market.236 There are indications that England is likely to regulate third-
party litigation funding by means of national legislation.237 At present, if funding 
becomes available to consumers, these consumers may fall under the protection of 
the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer Credit Act 2006.238 Hodges, 
Peysner and Nurse go further and state that the basis of arguments that litigation 
funding should be regulated lies in concerns about the impact on consumers.239 They 
are in agreement with the American literature regarding concerns about the 
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development of a system that benefits lawyers and claims managers to the detriment 
of consumers and the judicial process.240 Thus, they advocate for the expansion of the 
protection offered by the Consumer Credit Act 2006 as the current protection is not 
adequate. 
In addition, court rules should be developed to ensure effective control over third-party 
funded litigation.241 The European Union has adopted a non-binding Recommendation 
for Member States which includes several safeguards in respect of collective redress 
litigation funded by third parties.242 This includes a recommendation that the claimant 
party in collective cases should be required to “declare to the court at the outset of the 
proceedings the origin of funds that it is going to use to support the legal action”.243 
A measure recommended by the Review of Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation 
in Scotland and which the US Chamber also addresses is the disclosure of funding 
mechanisms. In the review Sheriff Principal James Taylor states as follows: 
I am of the view that disclosure of the means of funding should be required in every 
litigation. With respect to third-party funding, I note that defenders are in favour of a 
requirement to disclose, and for good reason. Disclosure has implications for how 
defenders proceed, for their willingness to settle, and for their willingness to settle early. 
Funders, who mainly fund claimants, likewise referred to the advantages of disclosure. 
In particular, they could look forward to earlier settlement, which had implications for 
the return on their investment.244 It would appear, then, that disclosure expedites 
dispute resolution to the benefit of both parties and promotes efficiency in the legal 
system. If this is correct, I fail to see why disclosure of a litigation funding arrangement 
should not be desirable for all funded parties, whether they are pursuers or defenders. 
If, as I recommend, third party funders are liable for a proportion of the other side's 
expenses should the funded client be unsuccessful, then disclosure is also necessary. 
He further states that:  
I therefore recommend that in all civil litigation in the Scottish courts, parties should be 
under an obligation to disclose to the court and intimate to all parties the means by 
which the litigation is being funded at the stage when proceedings are raised or 
notification given that a case is to be defended. Thus if an action is being funded by a 
trade union or a damages based agreement, for example, it should be disclosed in the 
same manner as a legally aided party is obliged to disclose that assistance has been 
obtained from the Legal Aid Fund. Disclosure should include both the type of funding 
and the identity and address of the funder. It should not include details of the financial 
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agreement made between the funder and the funder's client before the case has been 
decided as this may provide opponents with too deep an insight into the funder's view 
as to the strength of the funded case.245 
When formulating a national regulatory scheme for litigation funding agreements, the 
English legislature should also consider requiring litigants to disclose the source of 
their funding so as to allow opponents to adequately defend their cases as discussed 
above. Hence, the English rules of court should require disclosure to all parties 
involved of the means by which the litigation is being funded on the onset of the 
proceedings as recommended by the Scottish review above. 
The CJC is an advisory public body established under the Civil Procedure Act 1997 
which is responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating the modernisation of the civil 
justice system. The CJC views litigation funding as an effective future means of 
providing access to justice in addition to contingency fee agreements.246 The CJC 
noted that third-party funding in 2007 had already become established in England and 
Wales following the decision in Arkin, where the Court of Appeal examined the issue 
of third-party litigation funding in detail. The CJC published its report recommending 
the acceptance of litigation funding.247 The CJC’s second report in June 2007248 
concluded that properly regulated third-party funding should be recognised as an 
acceptable funding option for mainstream litigation.249 
With regard to the regulation of commercial litigation, funders registered and based in 
England are regulated to some extent by the Financial Conduct Authority as 
investment firms but the litigation funding product is not regulated.250 In 2009, Lord 
Justice Jackson also suggested that if a statutory regulation is implemented, it should 
be under the Financial Conduct Authority. Beisner and Rubin further argue that formal 
regulation raises threshold questions like whether such a regime should be targeted 
at third party investors, attorneys who represent clients receiving third-party funding 
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investments or both.251 They argue that the protection should focus on the third party 
funding investors whose activities are presently not subject to effective regulation.252 
They maintain that regulating attorneys alone will not address most of the risks posed 
by third-party litigation funding.253 They state that adequate protection can only be 
achieved by direct regulation of the investors who provide the financing and therefore 
exert the most influence.254 In any event, attorneys are already governed by existing 
rules of professional conduct.255 
In their report entitled Litigation Funding Status and Issues, Hodges, Peysner and 
Nurse state that “it is currently possible to state the policy that applies in England on 
access to justice, and funding of litigation, as a result of the extensive analysis by Lord 
Jackson and the subsequent government reforms in a 2009 report”.256 The writers 
argue that provision of access to justice is an important constitutional and fundamental 
right. However, the principle is subject to qualifications.257 Among such qualifications 
they agree that claims with good merit should be encouraged as this would promote 
access to justice but the same cannot be said for claims with poor merit.258 There is 
limited tolerance for speculative litigation aimed at testing the boundaries of the law. 
However, test cases that clarify uncertainties in the law, and consequently have wide 
practical effect, should be permitted.259 Still, parliament rather than the courts remains 
the major forum for addressing law reform.260 The above authors also say that public 
funding for legal services for civil litigation is severely limited. Therefore, private 
funding is to be encouraged.261 The European Union is of the opinion that the claimant 
should be prohibited from basing the funder’s remuneration on the amount of the 
settlement reached or the compensation awarded.262 An exception is when the funding 
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arrangement is regulated by a public authority. In England this would be the Financial 
Services Authority (the regulatory functions of which have now been inherited by the 
Financial Conduct Authority).263 The Commission further states that it has not ruled 
out third-party financing for European collective redress but proposes that certain 
conditions should apply, particularly transparency to prevent conflict of interests.264  
In addition, Beisner and Gary agree that government oversight is essential as third-
party litigation funding investors use litigated proceedings and compulsory court 
processes as their investment vehicles.265 In other words, funding investors make 
money by using the coercive power of government to command defendants to appear 
in court or before arbitrators, turn over documents, and defend themselves. In these 
circumstances, regulating third-party litigation funding investors’ actions is an entirely 
proper function of government.266 
With regard to government oversight, the Institute for Legal Reform in the United 
States proposes a “three-pronged” approach: 
 The designation of a government agency to oversee third-party litigation funding 
investments.267 
 The enforcement of a regime of statutory safeguards against the abuses in third-
party litigation funding investments by the federal agency.268 
                                            
263   Strasbourg 2013  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-524_en.htm 2. 
264   Strasbourg 2013 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-524_en.htm 2; see also Hodges, 
Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 124-143. 
265   Beisner and Rubin 2012 (October) ILR 7. 
266   Beisner and Rubin 2012 (October) ILR 7. 
267   Beisner and Rubin 2012 (October) ILR 10; they propose that the US. government should empower 
the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) to regulate the third-party litigation funding investment 
industry. The FTC was created in 1914 to prevent unfair methods of competition in commerce. 
This agency has a long, successful record of bringing enforcement actions against entities that 
engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. In the year 2011, for example, the agency has 
obtained over $9 million in civil penalties from companies that engaged in unfair or deceptive 
practices. During the same period, the FCT has obtained numerous cease-and-desist, 
disgorgements, and civil-contempt orders against companies that have violated the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. If it is designed as a federal agency to oversee third-party litigation funding 
investments, the FTC should be given three specific grants of authority: (1) to licence third-party 
litigation funding investors, (2) to make rules and regulations governing third-party litigation funding 
investments and (3) to enforce any laws, rules and regulations governing third-party litigation 
funding investments. 
268   Beisner and Rubin 2012 (October) 11; The writers argue that government should, by legislation, 
implement specific safeguards that the FCT may enforce. These safeguards would be of two types: 
46 
 
 The making of court rules requiring judge-controlled disclosures at the outset 
when third-party litigation funding is being used. The reason for this proposal is 
that a defendant facing a claim funded by a third-party litigation funding investor 
may not realise who is guiding litigation strategy and decisions on the other side, 
as such contracts are usually secret, making it unfairly difficult for defendants to 
mount an adequate defence. As such, disclosure requirements will correct this 
problem.269  
The Association of Litigation Funders responded to the above approach in its 
parliamentary briefing. It argued that the litigation funding briefing for parliamentarians 
circulated by the US Chamber of Commerce demonstrates a surprising ignorance of 
the differences between the US and English litigation systems and unfairly maligns 
litigation funding and its protagonists.270 It also stated that in recent years the litigation 
funding market in England and Wales has experienced reasonably strong demand not 
just from Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) seeking access to justice, but 
also from large, solvent commercial entities who see litigation funding as an invaluable 
and otherwise unavailable risk management tool with which to hedge the uncertainties 
and costs risks of large-scale commercial litigation.271  
The Association of Litigation Funders stresses that properly structured litigation 
funding can operate within the framework provided by common law principles of 
maintenance and champerty.272 These public policy concepts remain relevant and set 
principles for proper conduct that are acknowledged and respected by member 
funders and are enshrined in the Code.273 In support of its claim, the Association 
emphasises that there is no evidence supporting the view that in England and Wales 
funders seek to take control of the litigation or of settlement negotiations. Furthermore, 
funders leave the day-to-day conduct of the litigation to the litigant and its legal team, 
                                            
statutory provisions that would govern third-party litigation funding investors generally, and 
statutory provisions governing third-party litigation funding investors’ conduct in particular disputes. 
269   Beisner and Rubin 2012 (October) ILR 14. 
270   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 1. 
271   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf1. 
272  Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 1. 
273   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 1. 
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claiming the right simply to be kept informed of progress.274 The Association 
elaborated by stating that concerns raised by the US Chamber are essentially a 
reflection of their experiences in the US, and such concerns are largely unfounded in 
England and Wales.275 It added that the US Chamber alleges a risk of increasing 
numbers of spurious suits with the potential to harm the British economy. The 
Association stated that in commercial litigation in England and Wales the loser pays 
the winner’s costs and claims that this is a highly potent disincentive to spurious law 
suits.276 Furthermore, the US Chamber’s claim about the proliferation of spurious class 
actions illustrates a lack of familiarity with the practical limits of class actions in England 
and the inbuilt limitations on damages awards due to the absence of juries empowered 
to award punitive damages in civil cases.277  
The Scottish review of third-party litigation funding supports the Institute’s argument 
on the “three pronged” approach and states as follows: 
[R]ecent evidence suggests that the market is not only expanding in England and 
Wales but that funders are planning to extend into new markets, such as multi-party 
actions and divorce. This extension into cases involving ordinary citizens may mean 
that the case for transparency and regulation is stronger now than in 2009 when 
Jackson LJ was writing.278 
It found that in 2012 there was a rising demand for third-party litigation funding in 
England and that the high returns from investing in commercial disputes with good 
prospects for success and high levels of reward were not enough for funders.279 It 
suggested that some funders are starting to diversify their portfolios and are investing 
in a broader range of claims, including personal injury group actions.280 
Hodges, Peysner and Nurse argue that a voluntary scheme does not address the 
requirements of a developing market and the “potential harm caused by the 
                                            
274   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 1. 
275   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 2. 
276   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 2. 
277   Association of Litigation Funders of England & Wales date unknown 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2996/parliamentary%20briefing%20final%20270112.pdf 1-2. 
278   Taylor 2013 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/10/8023/27. 
279   Financier Worldwide 2012 http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/. 
280   Financier Worldwide 2012 http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/. 
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emergence of new funders who may develop new litigation funding products and 
alternative business models that fall outside the scope of the code”.281 The writers 
state that third-party funding in England has already expanded to the point where 
regulation by the Ministry of Justice, the Legal Services Ombudsman or a financial 
regulator should be considered.282 They doubt whether a voluntary code would provide 
adequate sanctions for dealing with rogue funders and bad practice.283 
They argue that the cost-shifting regime should apply to court litigation as a general 
principle subject to three caveats; 
 The regime should contain elements that deter the bringing of frivolous claims 
and incentivise claimants to accept reasonable offers of settlement.284 
 In order to give effect to the social policy that certain types of claimants should 
be protected against the risk of adverse costs,285 there should be a qualified one-
way cost rule for them, instead of the normal two-way rule. The qualified 
approach makes it possible to target the protection at those who need it and 
gives them a stake in the outcome so as to exert some control over costs. A 
similar approach operated successfully under the legal aid regime.286 The 
protection should apply to cases where there is an unequal relationship between 
the parties, for example personal injury cases and defamation cases, and there 
should be further consultation on applications in respect of housing disrepair, 
actions against the police, claimants seeking judicial review, and individuals 
claiming defamation or breach of privacy. 
 The economic realities of litigation costs necessitate a change from the traditional 
position which is that successful claimants should receive damages in full to one 
                                            
281   Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 143, 148 and 151. 
282   Taylor 2013 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/10/8023/27. 
283   Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 149. 
284   Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 123. 
285   And in the light of data that suggest that most personal injury claims are valid. 
286   Still enshrined in the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 11(1): ‘Costs ordered against an individual ... 
shall not exceed the amount (if any) which is a reasonable one for him to pay having regard to all 
the circumstances including – (a) the financial resources of all parties to the proceedings and (b) 
their conduct in connection with the dispute…’. 
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where claimants can be expected to pay some costs out of their damages.287 
However, the amount of success fees that lawyers may deduct is capped at 25 
per cent.288 
As some of these issues are more closely concerned with ADR and the courts, they 
fall outside the scope of this study and will not be investigated. The recognition of other 
methods of funding litigation was a significant step in developing third-party litigation 
funding agreements and thus makes them less unfavourable under the laws of 
maintenance and champerty. A number of key cases that expanded the scope of third-
party litigation funding agreements and limited the common law doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty also significantly influenced these developments. 
It is clear from the above account that the controversy surrounding third-party litigation 
funding agreements will continue in England, and as this industry also affects 
interstate commerce, other jurisdictions are also affected thereby. This is evidenced 
by the US Chamber of Commerce’s comments on the English position and its 
recommendation for a fully regulated system by government as opposed to the current 
self-regulating system in England despite the Association of Litigation Funder’s 
opposing view that there is merit in a self-regulating system. The above proposed 
options for reform in the English legal system will certainly change the litigation funding 
industry if enacted by the legislature. The conclusion provided below recaps the 
development of third-party litigation funding, changes in policy and options for reform 
in England. 
2.8  Conclusion 
As discussed in this chapter, the public policy against the doctrines of champerty and 
maintenance has changed in England over the years. This public policy consideration 
dates back from the time when third parties were a threat to the integrity of the judicial 
system and some of the reasons for opposition to these doctrines are still relevant in 
England. However, drastic changes have taken place and some situations require the 
courts to promote access to justice over the archaic rules of maintenance and 
                                            
287   Protection of personal injury claimants by a one-off rise in the level of general damages for pain 
and suffering and loss of amenity would be increased by 10 per cent. 
288   Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding 109. 
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champerty. These changes are evidenced by a number of English court decisions289 
dating from 1919. These changes, including the origin and change in the perception 
of the application of maintenance and champerty, were chronicled by Winfield.290  
The change in public policy came to the forefront with the inclusion of the two doctrines 
in the Solicitors Act which prohibited legal practitioners from entering into conditional 
fee agreements in violation of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty.291 The 
aim of the inclusion was to deter ethical misconduct but it also made other forms of 
litigation funding impossible. The change began in 1967 when legislation was passed 
to abolish the two doctrines as crimes and tort and there was a further change during 
the 1990s when the legislature promulgated the Access to Justice Act of 1999 to 
regulate conditional fee agreements. 
This gradually led to the courts openly allowing third parties to fund litigation actions 
in order to promote access to justice. This resulted in the emergence of commercial 
litigation funders and the measures to hold such funders liable for adverse cost 
orders.292 It further led to debates about the regulation of third-party litigation funding 
and now the market for third-party litigation finance is regulated by the Association of 
Litigation Funders, albeit on a voluntary basis. Non-members are still regulated by 
common law principles and most of them are not easily detected as they provide 
funding privately since disclosure of funding arrangements is not considered a priority 
in the English courts. The criticisms levelled against the litigation funding arrangement 
in England are aimed at the effectiveness of a self-regulation system. 
In this chapter it was argued that self-regulation of third-party litigation funding fails to 
address the problems associated with this kind of funding. Furthermore, it was argued 
that the public has an interest in the funding mechanism and as such a public institution 
should be tasked with overseeing the conduct of litigation funders. Litigation funders 
must answer to a government-regulated body that will not only enforce the provisions 
of the Code of Conduct but also be independent and objective. The chapter has 
                                            
289   Cases such as British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 
KB 1006, 77 LJKB 649 CA; Neville v London Express Ltd [1919] AC 368; Re Trepca Mines Ltd 
(No 2) [1963] Ch 199; Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686; Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit 
Suisse [1980] QB 629; Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142. 
290   Winfield (1919) L Q Rev 35-50. 
291   S 59(2)(b); r8 of the Solicitors’ Practice Rules 1990. 
292   Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 655. 
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established that the Association of Litigation Funders in England is hardly a 
government body that is capable of impartiality. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
self-regulating code does not reach further than the members of the Association. 
The study has indicated that one of the criticism of the US Chamber of Commerce on 
funding regulation in England is that the Association does not represent the majority 
of litigation funders within the industry. The notable criticism is that those who are not 
members cannot be penalised for disregarding the provisions of the voluntary Code of 
Conduct or be banned from the Association. It was argued that the seven litigation 
funders that are members of the Association of Litigation Funders represent the larger 
litigation funding providers in England and therefore may not represent the interests 
of the smaller litigation funders who are non-members. As such, the impartiality of the 
Association’s policies can be questioned as it may promote the interests of the 
member funders over the interests of non-member funders. 
The chapter argues that the ideal way to address these deficiencies is to follow the 
proposal of the US Chamber of Commerce for a government-funded external body 
such as the Financial Services Authority (the “FSA”). In England, the Code of Conduct 
should be embodied in national legislation so that it will regulate all instances of third-
party litigation funding.293 It is argued that a regulated system of third-party litigation 
funding would properly guide the growing number of litigation funding agreements in 
England and that such a system would also encourage the funding of low-value 
claims.294 This will provide transparency in respect of such agreements which will 
better enable the courts to foresee possible abuses of the system including abuses by 
funders that are not members of the Association of Litigation Funders. The regulated 
system would be akin to the conditional fee agreements. A discussion of an aspect of 
third-party funding in Ontario, Canada, is provided below. It highlights the impact of 
contingency fee agreements in the province of Ontario and the changes that 
developed. 
 
                                            
293   Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 121. 
294   Beisner and Rubin 2012 (October) ILR 7. 
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CHAPTER 3: ONTARIO: CANADIAN LAW PERSPECTIVE ON CONTINGENCY 
FEE AGREEMENTS  
3.1 Introduction  
The current chapter focuses on the Canadian perspective on contingency fee 
agreements concluded by lawyers. It outlines the historical development of 
contingency fee agreements and their prohibition by the doctrines of maintenance and 
champerty. The study also looks at the legal system of the province of Ontario as it is 
the last province to have permitted contingency fee agreements. Currently, Ontario is 
also one of the Canadian provinces that does not allow the conclusion of contingency 
fee agreements in certain family law cases.  
In Canada, there have been restrictions through legislation and case law on the scope 
of champerty and maintenance, both based on” Canadian contract law has English 
common law as its foundation in all its provinces with the exception of Quebec, as 
discussed above.295 References to some of the English authorities on the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty insofar as they have contributed to the development of 
public policy in Ontario, Canada, will therefore be included. The contingency fee 
arrangements in Canada will be discussed, including the development and acceptance 
of such agreements in certain family law cases as well as the role the Ontario courts 
play in overseeing the fairness of these agreements especially in settlement 
proceedings. 
3.2  Traditional policy on contingency fee agreements 
As a result of the inheritance of the English common law by Canada with the exception 
of Quebec, champertous agreements were void and considered to be against public 
policy.296 However, the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty were 
abolished in the 1960s in England upon the recommendation of the Law Commission, 
which concluded that an action for damages no longer served any useful purpose.297 
Conversely, the common law doctrine invalidating champertous contracts is still 
                                            
295   Refer to chapter 2 of the English perspective; see also Waddams Contract 414. 
296   See generally Winfield (1919) 35 Law Q. Rev. 50. 
297   Law Commission Maintenance and Champerty para [7]; see also Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L. J. 
534. 
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applicable in limited cases in Canada.298 As a consequence in the late nineteenth 
century, Ontario enacted An Act Respecting Champerty299 which reads: 
1.  Champertors be they that move pleas and suits, or cause to be moved, either by 
their own procurement, or by others, and sue them at their proper costs, for to 
have part of the land in variance, or part of the gains. 
2.  All champertous agreements are forbidden, and invalid. 300 
In addition to this Act, maintenance and champerty were torts at common law, making 
the third party or lawyer liable to the defendant for special damages suffered as a 
result of the third party or lawyer’s financial assistance, including the costs of 
defending the lawsuit.301 The defendant in the action could not move to stay the action 
on the basis of the third party or lawyer's maintenance since the maintainer is not a 
party to the action before the courts, and maintenance is not considered a defence 
against the merits of an action.302 Furthermore, maintenance and champerty were 
common law criminal offences in Ontario, Canada, until they were abolished in 1953 
by section 9 of the Criminal Code.303 The Criminal Code Revision Committee 
recommended their abolition on the basis that these crimes were “obsolete and 
archaic”.304 
With the above in mind, the following discussion will summarise the Canadian 
decisions on public policy against maintenance and champerty. The discussion will 
outline the meaning of the doctrines as defined by the courts in Ontario, the 
                                            
298   See McIntyre Estate v Ontario (Attorney General) 2002 45046 (ON CA), (2002) 61 OR (3d) 257 
(CA) para [25]; Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686 (CA). 
299  RSO 1897 c. 327 ss 1-2. 
300   The leading Canadian case is Fredrickson v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1986), 28 DLR 
(4th) 414 [1986] 4 WWR 504 (BCCA) Fredrickson concerned the assignability of a cause of action 
in tort and in contract. See also Continental Bank of Canada v Arthur Anderson & Co. (1987) 59 
OR (2d) 774 39 DLR (4th) 261 (HCJ); Plastyle Inc. v CKF Inc. (1992) 16 CCLT (2d) 55 8 BLR (2d) 
210 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)); 433616 Ontario Inc. (Re) (1992), 7 OR (3d) 670 (Gen Div); Caisse 
Populaire Vanier Ltée v Bales (1991) 2 OR (3d) 456 3 CBR (3d) 264 (Gen Div). 
301   See Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339 (CA) cited with approval in Newswander v Giegerich 
(1907) 39 SCR 354 in which the Supreme Court of Canada stated at 359: “That costs of defending 
a suit which has been improperly maintained may be recovered in an action of maintenance is 
true.” 
302   See Kroeker v Harkema Express Lines Ltd. (1973) 2 OR (2d) 210 (HC); and Davey v Tallon [1928] 
3 WWR 215 (Man KB). 
303   R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 s 9 amending S.C. 1953-54 c. 51, s 8. 
304   MacLeod and Martin (1955) Can. Bar Rev. 23-24. For case law on the criminal offence of 
champerty, see Goodman v The King, [1939] S.C.R. 446; R v Bordoff (1938) 70 CCC 35 (CSP); 
and Colville v Small (1910), 22 OLR 33 (HCJ). 
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requirements for establishing maintenance and champerty, the policy justifications for 
the rationale against maintenance and champerty, the exceptions to the general rule, 
and the application of the policy on contingency fee agreements. 
3.2.1 What are champerty and maintenance in Canada? 
Champerty is considered to be an egregious form of maintenance in which there is the 
added element that the maintainer shares in the profits of the litigation. Importantly, 
without maintenance there can be no champerty.305 Maintenance is committed by 
those who, for an improper motive, are guilty of wanton or officious intermeddling in 
the disputes of others in which they have no interest and where the assistance they 
render to one or the other party is without justification or excuse.306 The subheadings 
below will deal with the elements required to establish either maintenance or 
champerty and also identify instances where the maintainer has a legitimate interest 
and the assistance rendered to the litigant is not without justification or legitimate 
excuse.  
3.2.2 The requirements for maintenance and champerty  
In determining whether an agreement falls within the definition of maintenance and 
champerty, an improper motive must be established.307 The fact that one is financing 
a lawsuit is in itself insufficient to constitute maintenance.308 Similarly, the fact that 
there is an agreement to finance a lawsuit in exchange for a share in the proceeds is 
in itself insufficient to constitute champerty.309  
                                            
305   See Findon v Parker (1843), 11 M. & W. 675 (Eng Ex Div) 682 (1843) 152 ER 976 (Eng Ex Div) 
979; Fischer v Kamala Naicher (1860) 8 Moo Ind App 170 (England PC) 187; Newswander v 
Giegerich (1907) 39 SCR 354 (SCC) 359 362-63; Colville v Small (1910) 22 OLR 33 (Ont HC) 34; 
Neville v London Express Newspaper Ltd. (1918) [1919] AC 368 (UK HL) 378-79 382-83; R v 
Goodman [1939] SCR 446 (SCC) 449 453-54; Monteith v Calladine (1964) 47 DLR (2d) 332 
(BCCA) 342; S. (J.E.) v K. (P.) (1986) 55 OR (2d) 111 (Ont Dist Ct) 118 121; and Smythers v 
Armstrong (1989), 67 OR (2d) 753 (Ont HC) 756-57. See also Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 
321 (Eng CA) 357. 
306  See Monteith v Calladine (1964) 47 DLR (2d) 332 342 (BCCA), quoted with approval in Buday v 
Locator of Missing Heirs Inc (1993) 16 OR (3D) 257 267-268 (CA), Griffiths JA. 
307   Monteith v Calladine (1964) 47 DLR (2d) 332 (BCCA) 342; see also Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L J 
527. 
308   Monteith v Calladine (1964) 47 DLR (2d) 332 (BCCA) 342. 
309   Monteith v Calladine (1964) 47 DLR (2d) 332 (BCCA) 342. 
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In the case of Monteith v Calladine310 the court held that: 
It would appear, therefore, that champerty is maintenance plus an agreement to share 
in the proceeds, and that while there can be maintenance without champerty, there can 
be no champerty without maintenance. There must be present in champerty as in 
maintenance an officious intermeddling, a stirring up of strife, or other improper 
motive.311 
In S (JE) v K (P),312 the court also emphasised that an improper motive must be 
present: 
I must conclude that the motive of the party who interests himself in the suit of another 
is most relevant to determine whether maintenance is made out. If the motive is 
genuine and arises out of concern for the litigant's rights, it is not maintenance. Similarly 
if that interest of such party arises genuinely from an interest in the outcome, it is not 
maintenance and this is not restricted to blood relationships… 
As discussed in chapter 2, the English courts also reiterate that champerty and 
maintenance require the element of an improper motive.313 An improper motive is 
relevant and has been relied upon by the courts in considering the common law 
doctrine of champerty, particularly in creating exceptions to its application.314 The court 
in Fischer v Kamala Naicher315 held that champerty and maintenance must be 
something that goes against good policy and justice, tends to promote unnecessary 
litigation and that in a legal sense is immoral and implies the existence of a bad 
motive.316 
Thus, both maintenance and champerty require proof of an improper motive in 
providing the financial assistance, whether it is malicious or constitutes officious 
intermeddling, a stirring up of strife (for vexation or delay), or some other 
impropriety.317 In addition, both deal with the involvement of an uninterested third party 
                                            
310   1964 Carswell BC 150, 47 DLR (2d) 332; see also Buday v Locator of Missing Heirs Inc. (1993) 
16 OR (3d) 257 (Ont CA) 267-68. 
311   Monteith v Calladine (1964) 47 DLR (2d) 332 (BCCA) 342. 
312   1986 Carswell Ont 379, 10 C.P.C. (2d) 252, 55 OR (2d) 111 117. 
313   See Neville v London Express (1918), [1919] AC 368; (UKHL) 378-79, 382-83, 411-12, 414-15; 
Trepca Mines Ltd. (No. 2) Re (1962), [1963] 1 Ch. 199 (Eng. CA) 219-20; Giles v Thompson [1993] 
3 All ER 321 (Eng. CA) 328-29, 332 and 360; and Thai Trading Co. v Taylor [1998] QB 781 (Eng. 
CA) 786-90. 
314   S v K (1986), 55 OR (2d) 111 (Dist. Ct) 116. 
315  Fischer v Kamala Naicher (1860) 8 Moo Ind App 170 187 (PC). 
316   Fischer v Kamala Naicher (1860) 8 Moo Ind App 170 187 (PC); see also Newswander v Giegerich 
(1907) 39 SCR 354 (SCC) 360. 
317   Buday v Locator of Missing Heirs Inc (1993), 16 OR (3d) 257 (Ont. CA) 267-8. 
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in the litigation of others.318 It also appears that the third party, in addition to providing 
the financial assistance, must cause the action to be commenced, aggravated or 
enlarged in some way.319 Proof that the plaintiff has already consulted with a lawyer 
would indicate that the plaintiff was inclined to pursue a legal claim and that the third 
party was not intermeddling.320 The justifications or exceptions to maintenance and 
champerty are discussed below. 
3.2.3 Policy justifications 
The policy rationale against maintenance and champerty as inherited from the English 
common law was an attempt to minimise abusive interference in litigation by wealthy 
and powerful members of society.321 The Ontario Law Reform Commission’s Report 
on Class Actions describes the historical roots of the doctrines against maintenance 
and champerty as follows: 
Rules against maintenance and champerty were introduced over 700 years ago in 
response to abusive interference in the legal system by powerful royal officials and 
nobles. Although the particular abuses against which the prohibitions were directed 
had been cured by the time of the Tudors, the rules continued to survive. In modern 
decisions concerning maintenance, courts do not refer to the medieval origins of the 
doctrine, but justify its continued existence on the basis of public policy considerations. 
The antipathy of the courts to champertous agreements similarly is supported by policy 
concerns.322 
Justification for the doctrines focuses on the perceived abuses of the administration of 
justice. Puri argues that while this passage is a plain statement of the abuses that will 
result if champertous agreements are recognised at law, judicial decisions do not 
appear to critically analyse the extent of these perceived abuses. He further argues 
that these concerns appear to be overstated.323 Below are the exceptions to the 
general rule that invalidates agreements that are found to have been based on either 
maintenance or champerty. 
                                            
318   See American Home Assurance Co. v Brett Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd. (No. 2) (1992), 116 NSR (2d) 
319 (CA), rev'g (4 March 1992), Doe. SH 77076 (TD). 
319  Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L J 527. 
320   See Buday v Locator of Missing Heirs Inc (1993) 16 OR (3d) 257 (Ont. CA) 267; and R v Goodman 
[1939] SCR 446 (SCC) 449. 
321   Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L J 527. 
322   Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions vol. 3 (Ministry of the Attorney General 
1982) 717. 
323   Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L. J. 528. 
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3.2.4 Exceptions to the general rule 
The courts have recognised competing and overriding public policies and provided 
exceptions to the general rules against maintenance and champerty.324 The courts will 
not find a lawyer or a third party's financial assistance to be maintenance or champerty 
where the third party or lawyer's motive can be characterised as proper or 
legitimate.325 A proper and legitimate motive would be associated with charity and 
compassion,326 legitimate common interest,327 commercial interest,328 or legislative 
exceptions.329 
3.2.5 Public policy on lawyer’s contingency fees 
Contingency fee agreements for lawyers are prohibited by the common law definitions 
of champerty as discussed above, statutory definitions of champerty, and legislation 
governing lawyers.330 Prior to 1992, all Canadian provinces except Ontario had 
enacted legislation that permitted contingency fee arrangements between solicitors 
and clients in order to increase access to justice.331 Manitoba, for example, has 
authorised such fees since 1890, while most of the other provinces have permitted 
them for at least 25 years.332  
                                            
324   Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L. J. 528. 
325   Puri 1998 Osgoode Hall L. J. 528. 
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Campbell chronicled the acceptance of contingency fee agreements by the other 
provinces in Canada as follows: 
[W]hile some Canadian jurisdictions have introduced one form of contingency fee or 
other within the last decade or so (British Columbia – 1979; Saskatchewan -1975; New 
Foundland – 1986; Northwest Territories – 1979; and Yukon – 1980), others have 
permitted formal contingency fees for twenty years or more (Alberta – 1969; Quebec 
1968; New Brunswick – 1973; and Nova Scotia – 1972). Indeed Monitoba endorsed 
the use of contingency fees in 1890.333 
The regulatory schemes of contingency fee agreements in Canada are very similar 
but for some minor differences.334 An example of a self-regulated province with regard 
to contingency fees is Nova Scotia which is governed by the Civil Procedure Rules of 
the province.335 In most provinces there is a sliding scale of contingency fees, starting 
with lower fees if the case is resolved by a specific time and increasing if the case 
goes to trial.336  British Columbia, for example, imposes a ceiling on the percentage of 
the recovery that a lawyer may receive in certain types of proceedings. Most 
jurisdictions impose no such restrictions.337 All of the provinces require contingency 
fee agreements to be in writing and many jurisdictions require such agreements to be 
filed in court.338 In addition, each Canadian jurisdiction provides a mechanism by which 
a client may seek a review of the lawyer's fee.339 
In Ontario, contingency fees were legalised in 1992 in relation to class actions only 
when the Class Proceedings Act was enacted.340 The courts in Canada and England 
have repeatedly held that lawyers' contingency fee agreements were champertous 
and, as a result, unenforceable. In Solicitor Re,341 the court held that:  
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[T]he confidential relation between lawyer and client forbids any bargain being made 
by which the practitioner shall draw a larger return out of litigation than is sanctioned 
by the tariff and the practice of the Courts. Especially does the law forbid any 
agreement for the lawyer to share in the proceeds of a litigated claim as compensation 
for his services. Such a transaction is in contravention of the statute relating to 
champerty, and it is also a violation of the solemn engagement entered into by the 
barrister upon his call to the Bar. 
The reasons for the courts barring contingency fee agreements include the concern 
that the relationship of trust between lawyer and client may be tainted and that this 
may lead to the lawyer acting unethically to secure a win and avoid the fiduciary duty 
imposed by the profession.342 The argument in favour of contingency fee agreements 
indicates that lawyers have been acting in what was considered to be meritorious 
cases for impecunious clients on the understanding that, if they lost no fees would be 
paid.343  
These reasons have contributed to a change in the public policy on contingency fee 
agreements. The changes happened gradually in many jurisdictions and stem mainly 
from the experience of American, English, New Zealand, Australian and other 
Canadian jurisdictions. Ontario accepted contingency fee agreements after most 
common law countries had abolished the “archaic” restrictions. The public policy 
changes in Ontario regarding contingency fee agreements will be discussed below. 
3.3  The current position of contingency fee agreements in Ontario, Canada  
In 1954, the Canadian parliament abolished all common law crimes, including 
champerty and maintenance. However, champerty and maintenance continued to be 
actionable in tort in Ontario upon proof of special damages.344 In addition, the 
Champerty Act provided that champertous agreements are forbidden and invalid.  
The English Court in Giles v Thompson,345 in a judgment which influenced Canadian 
public policy on maintenance and champerty, described the change in public policy as 
follows:  
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[T]he law of maintenance and champerty has not stood still, but has accommodated 
itself to changing times: as indeed it must if it is to retain any useful purpose…the law 
on maintenance and champerty can best be kept in forward motion by looking to its 
origins as a principle of public policy designed to protect the purity of justice and the 
interests of vulnerable litigants. 
It is only when a person has an improper motive, which includes, but is not limited to, 
officious intermeddling or stirring up strife, that a person will be found to be a 
maintainer.346 In support of contingency fee agreements and access to justice the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Coronation Insurance Co v Florence347 also held that: 
The concept of contingency fees is well established in the United States although it is 
a recent arrival in Canada. Its aim is to make court proceedings available to people 
who could not otherwise afford to have their legal rights determined. This is indeed a 
commendable goal that should be encouraged…Truly litigation can only be undertaken 
by the very rich or the legally aided. Legal rights are illusory and no more than a source 
of frustration if they cannot be recognised and enforced. This suggests that a flexible 
approach should be taken to problems arising from contingency fee arrangements, if 
only to facilitate access to the courts for more Canadians. Anything less would be to 
preserve the courts facilities in civil matters for the wealthy and powerful. 
This was echoed by the Law Society of Upper Canada which has supported the 
regulation of contingency fees since 1988 and has restated their support in 1992 and 
2000.348 Furthermore, in 1997 the Ontario Legal Aid Review recommended that the 
Ontario government introduce legislation that would allow contingency fee 
arrangements for lawyers in Ontario.349 The report noted that legal aid certificate 
coverage had been removed for most civil litigation matters and that permitting 
contingency fee agreements would be an important step in addressing the resulting 
difficulty of accessing the courts.350 In 2000, the Attorney General's Joint Committee 
on Contingency Fees- also recommended permitting contingency fees, except in 
criminal and quasi-criminal cases, and in family law proceedings. The Joint Committee 
Report stated that: 
One way to make justice more accessible is to provide a flexible approach to the 
payment of legal services by permitting contingency fees. Contingency fees are 
advantageous for middle class litigants because they shift most of the risk of litigation 
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from a client to a lawyer. Under a contingency fee agreement, the lawyer finances the 
litigation for the client while a case is pending. As a result, middle class clients, who 
are generally risk averse, do not have to commit to pay an unpredictable amount for 
their lawyer’s services and are then able to turn to the justice system to seek redress 
for their injuries… 
A variety of controls and safeguards can be imposed to regulate contingency fees to 
protect consumers, avoid abuse and prevent over-charging by lawyers, including: 
restrictions on the area of practice to which contingency fees can be applied, 
restrictions on clients, regulation of the lawyer's remuneration, review of the 
contingency fee contract, filing the contract with the court and regulating the form and 
content of the contract.351 
Although the development of the common law is usually an evolutionary and 
incremental process rather than the result of a single defining judgment, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in McIntyre Estate v Ontario (Attorney General)352 changed the 
rhetoric for other cases to follow. The Court of Appeal held that there is no apparent 
reason why a policy that favours contingency fee agreements for class actions would 
not apply equally to litigation brought by individuals.353  
In McIntyre Estate354 the facts were as follows: Mr McIntyre was addicted to cigarettes 
and died of lung cancer. For his alleged wrongful death, his widow, as executrix of his 
estate, sued Imperial Tobacco and Venturi Incorporated, a manufacturer of a plastic 
device used to reduce tar and nicotine. The action was commenced in Ontario, but 
Mrs McIntyre could not afford the suit. However, Rochon, a Genova law firm, was 
prepared to take on her case provided the court approved the use of a contingency 
fee agreement. The proposed agreement was that if the litigation failed then the estate 
would be charged neither a fee nor for the disbursements, but if the litigation 
succeeded then the estate would pay 33% of the compensatory damages recovered, 
100% of costs recovered, 100% of disbursements not otherwise recovered from the 
defendants, and 40% of the punitive, aggravated or exemplary damages. After 
commencing her suit for damages, Mrs McIntyre, in separate proceedings against the 
Ontario Attorney-General, applied for a declaration that the proposed fee agreement 
with her lawyers did not offend the Champerty Act. In the alternative, she sought a 
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declaration that the Champerty Act was unconstitutional and void or, in the further 
alternative, that the estate’s action should be permitted as a constitutional exemption. 
Wilson J in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the application in part. She 
declared that the proposed fee agreement did not offend the Champerty Act but, in 
her view, it was premature to approve the contingency fee arrangement. She did not 
rule on the constitutional law issues.355 The Attorney-General appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal and, although technically speaking, his appeal was granted, practically 
speaking the appeal was a failure. 
In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General’s arguments in favour of preventing 
contingency fee agreements in civil lawsuits for other than class actions (where such 
fees are authorised by statute356) failed. The Attorney-General’s unsuccessful 
argument was that the Champerty Act outlawed contingency fee agreements.  
The court further held that although sharing in another’s lawsuit is an indicium of 
champerty, an agreement to share in the profits of another’s suit is not champertous 
unless there is also an improper motive.357 It went further in holding that participating, 
supporting and even taking a share in another’s lawsuit may be proper and justifiable, 
in which case there is no maintenance and no champerty.358 The court stated that 
motive was the determinative factor and indicated that it is only when a person has an 
improper motive which motive may include, but is not limited to, “officious 
intermeddling” or “stirring up strife”, that a person will be found to be a maintainer.359 
Further, the court stated that examining the motive of the person charged with 
champerty better promoted the purpose of the legislation, which was to protect the 
administration of justice from genuine abuses, both new and old.360 
The court furthermore held that, historically, courts in Ontario and in other jurisdictions 
were antagonistic toward contingency fee agreements. This was because of concerns 
that such agreements would tempt lawyers to act unethically and harm the 
administration of justice and that such agreements could give rise to conflicts of 
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interest between the lawyer and his or her client in the carriage and settlement of the 
litigation.361 However, the court was also of the view that there was little evidence to 
justify the concerns, and the experience of jurisdictions that permitted contingency fee 
agreements showed that the concerns were unsubstantiated.362 Although the court in 
McIntyre Estate encouraged the legislature to assume responsibility, it considered that 
the court would be able to change the Ontario law on contingency fee agreements as 
a matter of developing the common law and held that the court need not wait for 
legislative action.363 The court rejected the Attorney-General’s argument that changes 
in Ontario law regarding the legality of these agreements should be made only by the 
legislature. 
 
The McIntyre Estate decision narrowed the scope of An Act Respecting Champerty of 
1897. The court further held that the effect of the legislation was simply to apply the 
common law doctrine of champerty to such agreements and, furthermore, the court 
held that the common law treatment of lawyer’s contingency fee agreements should 
be considered to have evolved over time.  
In Ontario, contingency fee agreements would no longer be champertous per se 
unless tainted by an improper motive and contrary to the law.364 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court drew support from the policy considerations relating to access to 
justice that favour the use of contingency fee arrangements and the reforms 
introduced in other jurisdictions.365  
Nevertheless, the court granted the Attorney-General’s appeal because it could not be 
determined on the record whether the particular fee agreement before the court was 
champertous.366 Accordingly, the enforceability of the contingency fee arrangement in 
a particular case must often be determined in the light of the ultimate result and the 
extent of compensation afforded to the lawyer in question.367 Even after such an 
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acceptance of contingency fee agreements, in Canada contracts that promote 
maintenance or champerty, even if not invalid on the ground that they are agreements 
to commit criminal or tortious acts, should be susceptible to attack on the ground that 
they interfere with the proper administration of justice.368  
The Superior Court of Justice in Raphael Partners v Chester Lam369 also upheld a 
contingency fee agreement as fair and reasonable under the tests imposed by the 
Solicitors Act.370 The court had set guidelines for the enforcement of a contingency fee 
agreement. The court in Raphael further held that the contingency fee was “fair and 
reasonable” where the contingency fee agreement was for 15% of the first $1 million 
and 10% of each subsequent $1 million in damages, plus recovered costs, totalling 
$431,313 plus GST on a $2.5million settlement.  
Due to the influence of both the McIntyre Estate and Raphael judgments, the Law 
Society of Upper Canada amended its Rules of Professional Conduct to permit 
contingency fees for some types of litigation.371 Immediately afterwards, a private 
member’s bill to regulate contingency fee agreements was enacted in the Ontario 
legislature to legalise and regulate contingency fee agreements.372 Contingency fee 
agreements were allowed in Ontario in 2002 when amendments were made by 
inserting section 28.1 into the Solicitors Act373 which provides that: 
 The solicitor and his/her client may enter into a contingency fee agreement in 
accordance with this section.374  
 The agreement will provide for the payment of fees upon the success of the 
case.375  
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 The section excludes proceedings under the Criminal Code (Canada) or any 
other criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, or a family law matter.376  
 The section also states that the agreement must be in writing for it to be 
binding.377 The subsection goes on to state that the amount of the contingency 
fee to be paid to the solicitor must not be more than the maximum percentage, if 
any, prescribed by regulation of the amount or of the value of the property 
recovered in the action or proceeding, however the amount or property is 
recovered.378  
 The section further provides that a greater maximum amount may be permitted 
upon approval by the Superior Court (taking into account the nature and 
complexity of the action or proceeding and the expense or risk involved in it and 
may consider such other factor as the court may deem relevant).379 Furthermore, 
it states that the agreement shall not include costs except with leave of the 
court.380 
 Pursuant to section 28.1(12) of the Solicitors Act, the Lieutenant-Governor-in-
Council is empowered to make regulations concerning contingency fee 
agreements related to a number of matters. No maximum percentage or 
remuneration has been established in Ontario by any regulation. However, 
section 5 of Regulation 195/04 states that court approval is required for any 
contingency fee agreement entered into by a litigation guardian acting for a 
person under disability.  
Section 5 of Regulation 195/04 reads as follows: 
5(1) A solicitor for a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian with 
whom the solicitor is entering into a contingency fee agreement shall, 
(a)  apply to a judge for approval of the agreement before the agreement is finalised; 
or 
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(b)  include the agreement as part of the motion or application for approval of a 
settlement or a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The commentary under rule 2.08(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct lists the 
factors which should be considered when determining the appropriate percentage for 
the contingency fee and reads as follows: 
In determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of the contingency fee, the 
lawyer and the client should consider a number of factors, including the likelihood of 
success, the nature and complexity of the claim, the expense and risk of pursuing it, 
the amount of the expected recovery and who is to receive an award of costs. The 
lawyer and client may agree that in addition to the fee payable under the agreement, 
any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs obtained as part of a 
settlement is to be paid to the lawyer, which agreement under the Solicitors Act must 
receive judicial approval. In such circumstances, a smaller percentage of the award 
than would otherwise be agreed upon for the contingency fee, after considering all 
relevant factors, will generally be appropriate. The test is whether the fee in all of the 
circumstances is fair and reasonable. 
In Re Cogan,381 the court held that in addition to the Rule 2.08 (3) factors identified by 
the Law Society, it would also consider “the valid social objective of ensuring that 
access to justice is maintained for injured plaintiffs, including children and parties 
under disability”. The court held as follows:382 
Therefore, when a contingency fee agreement is being presented for approval by the 
court, the following factors must be considered: a) the financial risk assumed by the 
lawyer, which is included under likelihood of success, the nature and complexity of the 
claim, and the expense and risk of pursuing it; b) the results achieved and the amount 
recovered; c) the expectations of the party; d) who is to receive an award of costs, and 
e) achievement of the social objective of providing access to justice for injured parties, 
including injured children and parties under disability. I find that these factors must be 
accorded much greater weight than the time spent by the lawyer. 
The additional considerations of the achievement of the ideal of access to justice for 
people in need is instrumental in providing adequate representation to the vulnerable 
groups in society. These factors are considered by the court to determine the fairness 
of such vulnerable groups’ fees before approving the exorbitant fees of the lawyers. 
The position in Ontario has evidently changed and improved since 2002 with regard 
to contingency fee agreements. As noted above, the landmark cases have shaped the 
perspective with regard to contingency fees and the legislature together with the Law 
Society have also made significant strides in ensuring that access to justice is realised. 
The measures advanced by the legislature, the courts and the Law Society 
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acknowledge the risk that lawyers take but also protect litigants from overreaching by 
lawyers. The section below will discuss the advantages and disadvantages in Ontario 
with regard to contingency fee agreements. 
3.4  Critical evaluation of contingency fee agreements in Canada 
3.4.1 Advantages of contingency fee agreements 
3.4.1.1 Access to justice 
The main advantage of contingency fee agreements is that they increase access to 
justice and improve the administration of justice.383 Contingency fee agreements also 
solve the problem of expensive litigation that denies access to justice to people with 
modest means.384 Contingency fee agreements are advantageous for middle class 
and indigent litigants and those who do not want to assume the risk of litigation 
because these agreements shift most of the risk from client to lawyer. In terms of a 
contingency fee agreement, the lawyer finances the litigation for the client while a case 
is pending. As a result, middle class clients, who are generally risk averse, do not have 
to commit to pay an unpredictable amount for their lawyer's services but are still 
provided with access to the justice system in order to seek redress for their injuries.385 
3.4.1.2 Criteria for contingency fees 
The judiciary has developed a mechanism in Ontario to assist the assessment officer 
in determining what would be the appropriate fee. Below is a list of factors that help to 
ensure that there is minimal abuse with regard to the enforcement of contingency fee 
agreements. The factors that must be considered in establishing a fair and reasonable 
fee were set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case of Cohen v Kealey & 
Blaney386 and similar factors were set out in the commentary under rule 2.08(2) of the 
Law Society's Rules of Professional Conduct. The factors listed in rule 2.08(2) are as 
follows: 
 the time and effort required and spent; 
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 the difficulty and importance of the matter; 
 whether special skills or services have been required and provided; 
 the amount involved or the value of the subject-matter; 
 the result obtained; 
 fees authorised by statute or regulation; and 
 special circumstances, such as the loss of other retainers, postponement of 
payment, uncertainty of reward, or urgency. 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Cohen was handed down before contingency fees 
were allowed in Ontario and it deals with the traditional factors which affect the fairness 
and reasonableness of a solicitor's fee without considering the effect of a contingency 
fee agreement. Rule 2.08(2) of the Law Society's Rules of Professional Conduct 
largely sets out the same factors that were considered in Cohen, and does not deal 
with a situation involving a contingency fee agreement. In addition, the Law Society 
enacted a new rule 2.08(3) which sets out the factors to consider when determining 
the appropriate percentage for a contingency fee. The courts find that the factors in 
rule 2.08(3) should be given more weight than the traditional factors, which do not deal 
specifically with a contingency fee agreement. 
3.4.3.3 Freedom to contract 
The contingency fee agreement represents the essence of freedom to contract.387 The 
client in a contingency fee agreement contracts away part of his legal claim.388 The 
contingency fee agreement also links the interests of the lawyer and the 
client.389Contingency fee agreements also empowers litigants to litigate where they 
are financially unable to do so.390 
The Ontario legislature intended to promote access to justice and to ensure that the 
cost of their legal system did not act as a barrier to justice when it amended the 
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Solicitors Act to allow contingency fees. Contingency fees are considered to be 
particularly important for very complex cases that involve lengthy and costly 
preparation.391 Despite the above advantages of contingency fee agreements, there 
are disadvantages to such agreements and they are analysed below. 
3.4.2 Disadvantages of contingency fee agreements 
3.4.2.1 Conflict of interest 
Contingency fees also pose serious risks to the due administration of justice.392 In the 
case of Tri Level Claims Consultants v Koliniotis,393 the Ontario court held that a lawyer 
or paralegal with a financial interest in the outcome of a case may be tempted to 
engage in sharp or even dishonest practice. Furthermore, a contingency fee 
agreement may also put a lawyer or paralegal in a conflict of interest position with his 
own client.394 For example, an offer to settle made early in the proceedings before a 
lawyer or paralegal has done much work may appear attractive to a lawyer or paralegal 
who is being paid a percentage of the settlement amount regardless of the work done. 
Such an offer may not do justice to the client’s claim but could create a direct incentive 
for the lawyer to settle the case for an amount that covers a substantial portion of his 
fees.395 
3.4.2.2 Control of litigation 
Unlike an attorney working for a flat rate, the contingency fee lawyer has a substantial 
financial interest in the claim as he only recovers his fee if the outcome favours his 
client.396 Control of litigation assumes greater significance in a contingency fee 
situation. The client might be willing to go to trial but since the lawyer has invested in 
the claim and assumed the financial risk, it is only plausible that the lawyer will exercise 
greater control.397 This also raises ethical concerns because the lawyer has assumed 
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the role of both lawyer and principal while the client is merely informed of the 
progression of the case and is not asked to provide instructions.398 
3.4.3.3 Prohibition of contingency fee agreements in family law, criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings  
The other disadvantage of contingency fee agreements is that they are prohibited in 
family law cases. As Perell explains: 
The exclusion of contingency fees for matrimonial matters may be explained by the fact 
that the contingency of success is not apt for most such proceedings, where divorces 
are available on a no-fault basis and where the major issue will often be dividing the 
assets, which is also a matter of some high predictability under matrimonial property 
regimes. In matrimonial disputes, the exposure to risk of failure is thus different than in 
other litigation. Further, there is the concern that contingency fees likely will be higher 
than regular fees, thus diverting assets that might be used, for example, to better 
support the children of the marriage.399 
This prohibition can result in a litigant in a family law matter being inadequately 
represented because of lack of financial assistance. Another disadvantage of 
contingency fee agreements is that they cannot be used in criminal and quasi-criminal 
proceedings as the outcomes of criminal proceedings do not produce any property 
that can be shared, which means that contingency fees would probably have utility for 
wealthy but not for poor or middle class clients.400 Thus, the chief value of contingency 
fees of facilitating access to justice is not advanced in the criminal context.401 
Despite these plausible advantages and disadvantages of the system governing 
contingency fee agreements, the system is not immune to reform and the next section 
will highlight some of the applicable reforms that may help to keep the current 
regulation in line with the societal needs of litigants. 
3.5 Reform of contingency fee agreements in Ontario, Canada  
In all the Canadian provinces except Ontario, no-win-no-fee arrangements are legal in 
some family law cases.402 The reason why the conclusion of contingency fee 
agreements in certain family law matters was considered necessary is that there is a 
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need to allow such contingency fee agreements. This appears from the letter of a 
group of family lawyers to the provincial government of Ontario.403 The position in other 
provinces like British Columbia is different where the court must approve a 
contingency fee agreement before it becomes valid and enforceable. Section 67(3)-
(5) of British Columbia’s Legal Profession Act404 provides that: 
(3)  A contingent fee agreement for services relating to a child guardianship or custody 
matter, or a matter respecting parenting time of, contact with or access to a child, 
is void. (4) A contingent fee agreement for services relating to a matrimonial 
dispute is void unless approved by the court.  
(5)  A lawyer may apply to the court for approval of a contingent fee agreement for 
services relating to a matrimonial dispute and section 66(7)-(9) applies. 
The rationale is that there are a number of married women who do not work outside 
their homes and who represent themselves in the family law court.405 Lawyers argue 
that this stacks the legal odds in favour of men, who are typically in control of family 
finances.406 They conclude that with the court’s approval certain family law matters 
ought to be allowed by the legislator, as in provinces like British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick and Yukon.407 
This clearly proves that there is a cogent argument for retaining the stance that family 
law matters should remain excluded from the application of contingency fee 
agreements unless approved by a court of law. These issues cannot be the sole 
rationale for change as litigants’ access to justice is not dependent upon the 
conclusion of such agreements. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The amended section 28.1 of the Solicitors Act of Ontario province has brought about 
significant changes in the development of contingency fee agreements in the province. 
The most noteworthy development investigated is the oversight function of the court 
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in settlement proceedings where there is a minor or disabled person involved. The 
court plays a pivotal role in approving any contingency fee agreement entered into on 
behalf or for the benefit of a disabled person or minor. The only development that the 
courts in Ontario have not sanctioned is the acceptance of such agreements in family 
law matters. The acceptance of contingency fee agreements in some family law 
matters will serve as a means of providing access to justice to those litigants who may 
be hampered by not being able to litigate because of absence of contingency fee 
agreements, if the court approves the agreement. 
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THIRD-PARTY 
LITIGATION FUNDING AGREEMENTS 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter highlights the significant developments regarding both lawyer and non-
lawyer funders of litigation where the funder is not a party to the proceedings. The 
South African legal system is compared with developments in England regarding non-
lawyer funders (which were discussed in chapter 2 above) and those in Ontario, 
Canada, regarding lawyer funders (as discussed in chapter 3 above). 
The outline of the chapter is as follows: Firstly, a brief historical overview of the South 
African development of third-party litigation funding agreements will be given. 
Secondly, a discussion of both lawyer and non-lawyer third-party litigation funding 
agreements is provided. Finally, the current position regarding contingency fee 
agreements is discussed. The legal positions in England, South Africa and Ontario are 
compared and the reforms that are necessary for the regulation of both agreements 
as informed by legal developments in England and Ontario are discussed.  
4.2 Brief historical overview of third-party litigation funding agreements408 
South Africa has a mixed legal system with its origins in Roman law, Roman-Dutch 
law and English law, which has greatly influenced the development of third-party 
litigation funding agreements. In Roman and Roman-Dutch law third-party litigation 
funding agreements were known as pacta de quota litis. A pactum de quota litis is an 
agreement in terms of which the funder undertakes to provide funds for litigation by 
the litigant in exchange for a share of the proceeds should the case be successful.409 
Third-party litigation funding agreements were regarded with distaste as they were 
considered to encourage speculative litigation and thus amounted to an abuse of the 
legal process.410 This adverse view was held irrespective of whether the funding was 
by lawyers or non-lawyers. 
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The earliest court case in South Africa that applied the legal writings of the Roman-
Dutch authorities is Hollard v Zietsman,411 where the advocate for the defendant 
argued that English law on champerty and maintenance is stronger than Roman 
law.412 This may explain the tendency of the courts to apply English law in third-party 
litigation funding arrangements. The advocate for the plaintiff added that the purpose 
of the Roman-Dutch law rule was to deter attorneys and advocates from speculating 
in litigation.413 After both advocates canvassed the Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
authorities on litigation funding, the court concluded that it is not illegal to agree with 
another to bear part of that other’s costs of litigation but agreements to purchase the 
subject matter of a suit (de quota litis) are illegal.414  
As was discussed in detail in chapter 2, under the English common law maintenance 
and champerty are the names given to agreements which may contravene the public 
policy as encouraging speculative litigation.415 Maintenance is the improper assistance 
by one person in litigation conducted by another, in which the former has no legitimate 
interest (in other words without just cause or excuse).416 In Giles v Thompson,417 Steyn 
LJ described champerty as an aggravated form of maintenance. Champerty occurs 
when the person maintaining another’s lawsuit stipulates in an agreement for a share 
of the proceeds of the action or suit should the action succeed.418 Both contracts were 
contrary to public policy.419  
The English common law condemned champerty to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system because the fear existed that champertous agreements could give rise to 
abuses such as the inflation of damages, suppression of evidence, and suborning of 
witnesses.420 In 1995, the English court in Aratra Potato Co v Taylor Johnson 
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Garrett,421 found that it was champertous to agree on a differential fee arrangement 
that depended on the outcome of the case. 
This view was also expressed in Campbell v Welverdiend Diamonds Ltd,422 where the 
court stated that:  
It is clear from the authorities that while a transaction of this kind may be properly 
entered into, and may be supported whether it is a genuine case of assisting a litigant 
for a fair recompense, it cannot be supported in other cases; a court is not to give effect 
to arrangements which are made by persons who traffic in litigation. 
In South Africa, however, it has long been accepted that an agreement to assist a 
litigant in exchange for a percentage of the proceeds (a pactum de quota litis) is lawful, 
if it was entered into in good faith423 and with the object of assisting the litigant in the 
exercise of his or her rights.424 
The partial acceptance of third-party litigation funding was foreshadowed in a 
paradoxical dictum delivered in a judgment by Innes CJ in Patz v Salzburg:425  
[O]f course it is against public policy to traffic or gamble in lawsuits, or to maintain them 
for speculative or wrongful purposes. That is both English and Roman-Dutch law. But 
it is not unlawful bona fide and properly to assist a litigant to defend or establish his 
rights, even though the person so assisting may derive some benefit from the subject-
matter of the action. 
The court emphasised the disapproval of third-party litigation funding agreements 
when applying the English common law rule of champerty and at the same time 
seemed to be willing to relax the rule by allowing such agreements where a bona fide 
third party who has no stake in the litigation finances the proceedings (maintenance), 
and also share the proceeds (champerty). The dictum foreshadows a later 
development in South African law where the legality of agreements in which non-
lawyers fund litigation is recognised. 
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After the Contingency Fees Act  legitimised contingency fee agreements between a 
litigant and a legal practitioner, the High Court in De la Guerre v Ronald Bobroff & 
Partners Inc 426 held that the Act is exhaustive on the subject and that any contingency 
fee agreement not in compliance with the Act is invalid.427 There has evidently been a 
steady development with regard to litigation funding arrangements in South Africa, 
following the English authorities on this subject. The following section will discuss the 
impact of third-party litigation funding agreements on non-lawyers as applicable in 
South Africa. 
4.3  Third-party litigation funding agreements with non-lawyers428 
It is trite by now that champerty and maintenance contracts are injurious to the 
administration of justice, and as a result, they are against public policy. This is also 
argued by the author Bradfield who state that the civil courts are designed primarily 
for the settlement of bona fide disputes between litigants with or without the assistance 
of entirely disinterested members of the legal profession and those that do not have 
the right of appearance in court.429 They further state that any contract that does not 
fit this pattern of litigation may contain the seeds of injustice and must therefore be 
scrutinised closely.430  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-
Operative Ltd431 commented that third-party litigation funding agreements are 
recognised in South Africa, because the civil justice system has developed its own 
inner strength.432 The court examined and endorsed some champertous agreements 
by holding that:433 
1  an agreement in terms of which a person provides a litigant with funds to prosecute 
an action in return for a share of the proceeds of the action is not contrary to public 
policy or void; 
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2 the illegality of such contracts would not be a defence in an action; 
3 litigation pursuant to such a contract may constitute an abuse of the process which 
in appropriate circumstances a court may prevent notwithstanding a litigant’s right 
of access to the courts enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution. 
This was the status quo for almost nine years until the Gauteng North High Court in 
Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd434 held that the litigation funder could be 
joined as a co-litigant in the litigation of another in order to be able to give a cost order 
against such funder. The court regarded this to be a logical progression from the 
recognition that champertous agreements are lawful.435 The court added that the 
ability to hold the funder liable for costs is one of the measures that the courts could 
adopt to counter any possible abuses arising from the recognition of the validity of 
champertous agreements.436 
Subsequent to the decision in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd437 to join a 
funder in the proceedings of another, the Western Cape High Court in EP Property 
Projects (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town438 granted a costs order against a 
litigation funder who had been joined in the litigation. The court looked at the position 
in English law and other common law jurisdictions, observing that costs orders would 
generally not be granted against what it referred to as “pure funders”, that is funders 
who do not seek to control the course of the litigation and lack any personal interest in 
the litigation.439 However, where the funder controls the proceedings and has a 
personal interest in their success, the funder is not so much facilitating access to 
justice as gaining access for his purposes, and becoming the “real” litigant.440 In this 
instance the court concluded that it is then considered that the funder should be held 
liable for any adverse costs order. 
Another important decision was that in Scholtz v Merryweather.441 In this case the 
Western Cape High Court applied the distinction laid down in EP Property Projects442 
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between the “pure funders” who are immune to adverse costs orders and controlling 
litigation funders who have a personal interest and seek to control the litigation. The 
court in Scholtz443 held that the funder was jointly and severally liable with the litigant 
for the costs of the application because the funder had not only funded the litigation 
but had also substantially controlled the proceedings by hindering service of 
summons, consulting lawyers and initiating the rescission application.444 He also stood 
to benefit in that, if the judgment could be rescinded, he would be relieved of his 
common law obligation to support the litigant who is his son.445 
The Gauteng Local Division in Gold Fields Ltd v Motley Rice LLC446 also approved 
and applied the distinction advanced in the EP Property Projects case447 between pure 
funders and other funders.448 The court in Gold Fields held that the funder was a “pure 
funder” because the funder did not stand to gain financially if the litigation was 
successful nor did he exercise substantial control over the litigation.449 The funder was 
merely facilitating access to justice and not “gaining access to justice for his own 
purposes”.450 
With regard to these developments, it is prudent to look back at Wallis’s remarks that 
funding provided by litigation investors can clearly be a viable solution to providing 
some litigants with access to the courts, although restrictions on the type of cases can 
be expected due to the potential ethical implications.451 These restrictive 
developments have the potential to affect litigation funding companies.  
There seems to be a proliferation of litigation funding companies in South Africa. In 2013 
the first litigation funding company, called the South African Litigation Funding 
Company (SALFCO), was established.452 Other litigation funding companies include 
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Astrea, Christopher Consulting and Litigation FundingSA. A few other companies have 
shown interest in investing in South African cases. Some examples are IMF Australia, 
which has been engaged as a funder in the high-profile case of Price Waterhouse 
Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd,453  and the London-based funder Calunius Capital.454 
The emergence of these funding companies and individuals has been accompanied 
by many problems.455 These problems relate to issues of transparency, fairness to 
clients, the impact of the funder in the case, and the influence that the funder has on 
overall decisions regarding the case.456 The problems that third-party litigation funding 
agreements pose are similar in England and.457 Beisner and Gary458 have outlined 
some of the problems with regard to third-party litigation funding agreements in the 
United States of America. Firstly, they argue that the proliferation of funders will 
increase the volume of uncertain litigation as these funders regard disputes as 
investments. Secondly, funders may try to exert control over strategic decisions 
relating to the case. Thirdly, funders tend to prolong litigation by preventing the 
settlement of the case. Lastly, lawyers tend to pay less attention to the interests of the 
litigant as the aim is to retain future business with the funder.459 The funders are not 
restricted to the percentage they generally charge clients and in some cases their 
charges may exceed what is considered reasonable.460 
The issue of concluding third-party litigation funding agreements in South Africa has 
not yet been addressed, except as regards the aftermath of such agreements, when 
the matter is before the courts.461 The current state of third-party litigation funding in 
South Africa is problematic in that it affords the funder more protection than the litigant 
as a client of the litigation funder.462 The litigant is not protected in terms of the National 
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Credit Act463 (hereinafter the National Credit Act) or the Consumer Protection Act464 
(hereinafter the Consumer Protection Act) as these agreements provide a wide scope 
of freedom of contract to the funder as the qui contractus initiat.465 In a case where the 
litigation is about land, for example, the litigant may end up losing half of the land as 
a result of the contract the litigant entered into with the funder.466 In terms of section 1 
of the National Credit Act, the agreement does not amount to a credit agreement.467 
The reason why the agreement cannot amount to a credit agreement is that the funder 
becomes entitled to payment only after achieving success in the litigation.468 This 
means that the funder will get professional disbursements and remuneration without 
interest in the ordinary sense but with an agreed-upon percentage of the capital award 
only when the case is successful, which is akin to a success fee.469 
It is clear therefore that there is an imbalance in this form of agreement, where the 
funder can charge an exorbitantly high fee on the grounds of the risk undertaken, even 
though the case appears prima facie to be meritorious.470 Although the Contingency 
Fees Act protects the litigants with regard to lawyers, third-party litigation funding can 
result in unfair and abusive contract terms for litigants.471 This is so because the 
Contingency Fees Act, which regulates funding provided by lawyers to litigants, does 
not apply. There is no limit to the amount a funder can draw after the finalisation of a 
matter he funded472 and there are no mechanisms regulating how the fee agreement 
should be worded or the exact clauses that should feature in the agreement to avoid 
invalidity.473 There are also no legal consequences for a failure to adhere to established 
standards.474 Although some practitioners seem to be confused about the application of 
the Contingency Fees Act, the Act contains clear guidelines regarding its application. 
In the light of the above discussion of the academic literature and case law, it is 
apparent that third-party litigation funding has recently become more acceptable in 
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South African law and elsewhere. As a result, there is a need for a more robust 
regulatory scheme in South Africa. The discussion also indicates that the challenges 
that South Africa is currently facing in respect of third-party litigation agreements are 
similar to those in other jurisdictions. Lawyers’ litigation funding agreements with their 
clients (contingency fee agreements) and their effects on litigants are discussed 
below. 
4.4  Third-party litigation funding agreements with lawyers 
In addition to third-party litigation funding agreements concluded with non-lawyers, 
there is a recognised phenomenon in South Africa, as in other common law countries, 
known as contingency fee agreements.475 Contingency fee agreements are the 
counterpart of non-lawyer third-party litigation funding agreements, since they allow 
lawyers to conclude champertous or maintenance agreements with their clients. In 
South Africa, the Contingency Fees Act regulates contingency fee agreements, and 
will be discussed below. 
The South African legislation on such agreements is based on English legislation.476 
It is now evident that the enactment of the Contingency Fees Act is consistent with 
legislative developments regarding contingency fee agreements in jurisdictions where 
English common law operates. In all these countries, the object pursued by way of 
legislative changes was to promote the public policy principle of access to justice.  
Bradfield observe that:477 
South African law consistently treated such contracts as contrary to public policy and 
void, until opinion finally came round to the view that a contract between a client and a 
legal practitioner for a contingency fee, within strictly controlled limits, should be 
permitted in order to give clients access to justice that they would otherwise not be able 
to afford. This thinking is embodied in the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997, which 
permits an advocate or attorney to enter into a contingency fees agreement with a client 
for payment of a fee only in the event of success. 
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This initiative was taken because of the number of middle class litigants who were 
unable to enforce their rights because of the cost of litigation and because they did not 
qualify for legal aid as provided for by the Legal Aid Act.478  
The Contingency Fees Act which came into operation on 23 April 1999 consists of 
seven sections. The Act was enacted to strengthen the right to access to the courts 
as provided for in section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996.479  
The Contingency Fees Act provides that a legal practitioner may conclude a written 
agreement with a client in any legal proceeding (except criminal proceedings and 
family law matters)480 after being satisfied that there are reasonable prospects of 
success.481 In addition, the Act also provides a framework of what would be “fair 
remuneration” in a contingency fee arrangement.482 There are two kinds of 
agreements that a legal practitioner may enter into with his client in terms of section 2 
of the Act. The first is a “no success no fee” agreement,483 and the second is an 
agreement whereby the legal practitioner may charge fees higher than the normal fee 
if the client is successful.484 The higher fee is also referred to as the success fee.485 
Only the second type of agreement is subject to the statutory caps.486 
The much-needed clarity of the second type of agreement that may be entered into by 
the legal practitioner and his or her client regarding the 100% cap of normal fees was 
provided by the North Gauteng High Court in Masango v Road Accident Fund,487 
(hereinafter the Masango case) as follows: 
The legal practitioner is authorised in terms of s 2(1)(b) read with s 2(2) of the CFA, as 
an incentive, to charge a success fee which is higher than his or her normal fee, subject 
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to the two caps. The normal fees of the attorney are taken as a base and the attorney 
is authorised to increase the normal or base fee by up to 100%. The attorney may 
thus increase the normal fee by say 10%, 20%, 30%, 45% etc, but the percentage 
increase may not exceed 100%. This is the first cap on success fees. What is important 
is that there is a base (the normal fee) from which a percentage increase is permissible. 
This is the ordinary and only basis on which the practitioner may increase fees. The 
legal practitioner first determines his normal fee, which he would have been entitled to 
charge without a contingency fees agreement, and then increases it in terms of the 
contingency fees agreement. The success fee is a fee which has been increased from 
the normal fee. It is thus necessary that we understand the meaning of 'fees', 'normal 
fees' and then 'success fees' as contemplated in the section.488 
Mojapelo DJP in Masango defined the terms “fee”, “normal fees” and “success fees” 
as used in the Act.489 After interpreting the ordinary meanings of the words, he defined 
a “fee” as a payment due to a professional person or body for services rendered or 
advice given.490 He then defined “normal fees” of an attorney for litigious work as fees 
or charges that would ordinarily be allowed on taxation.491 He further elaborated that 
normal fees are attorney’s fees for services actually rendered or for advice actually 
given or, simply put, fees that are included as attorney and client costs outside of any 
special arrangements.492 He finally defined “success fees” as normal fees which have 
been increased by a pre-agreed percentage. 
The clarity regarding the charging of more than 100% of success fees by practitioners 
will hopefully eliminate the pervasive overreaching by lawyers. In the Masango case 
for example, normal fees were not used as a base for charging the success fees, which 
is contrary to the Contingency Fees Act. The concluded contingency fee agreement 
simply charged 25% of the capital award and in addition charged 14% tax including 
disbursements. This was clearly a case of sharing in the proceeds and amounted to 
champerty, which the court vehemently disapproved of.  
The second cap introduced as a proviso to section 2(2) is the 25% cap on the capital 
award which only applies to claims sounding in money. The court in Masango provided 
that the cap does not apply to other claims litigated through a contingency 
agreement.493 The section states that in claims sounding in money the success fee 
                                            
488  Masango 514. 
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490  Masango 515. 
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shall not exceed 25% of the total amount awarded or obtained by the client (excluding 
costs).494  
The court in Masango emphasised that there is no basis in the Contingency Fees Act 
or anywhere else for the legal practitioner to charge a fee of 25% (or a smaller amount) 
of the capital award by the court to the client.495 The court further held that the 25% of 
the client’s capital award is introduced only as a cap and therefore the 25% cap is not 
a fee.496 The court furthermore held that the charge of 25% of the capital award is 
neither a percentage commission nor a share in the injuries or damages suffered by 
the client.497 Any agreement that makes a legal practitioner a partner in the injuries 
suffered by his client is contra bones mores and is therefore unlawful and illegal at 
common law (as it constitutes champerty) and under the Contingency Fees Act.498 
The practice of unlawfully sharing 25% of the client’s capital award by legal 
practitioners has come before the courts since the enactment of the Contingency Fees 
Act. The following cases are examples where a legal practitioner simply charged 25% 
of the client’s capital award: Mofokeng and 3 Others v Road Accident Fund,499 De la 
Guerre v Ronald Bobroff,500 Motswai v Road Accident Fund,501 Mfengwana v Road 
Accident Fund,502 Masango v Road Accident Fund.503 These cases are ordinarily 
settled and the legal practitioner whose normal fees even if doubled may not even 
amount to 25% of the client’s capital ends up receiving more for the services he 
actually rendered than he would have charged on a normal fee basis. 
Settlements are regulated by section 4 of the Contingency Fees Act which provides 
for transparency by requiring the filing of affidavits with the court if the matter is before 
the court or professional controlling body if the matter is not before the court by the 
legal practitioner accompanied by the client’s affidavit. The full terms of the settlement 
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must be included in the affidavits504 as well as an estimate of the amount that may be 
obtained should the matter go to trial.505 The section also provides that there should 
be an estimate of chances of success at trial.506 It adds that there should be an outline 
of fees if the matter is settled as compared to the case going on trial.507 The Act, 
furthermore, provides that the reasons for recommending settlement should be stated 
in the affidavit.508 There should be a statement that all of the above have been 
explained to the client and what steps have been taken to ensure that the client 
understand the explanation.509 Lastly there must be a statement that the settlement 
has been explained to the client and that the client accepts the terms.510  
The client must also provide an affidavit in which he declares that he was notified of in 
writing of the terms of the settlement, that the terms were explained to him and that he 
understands and agrees to them and his attitude to the settlement.511 
Finally, section 4(3) provides that any settlement made where a contingency fees 
agreement has been entered into shall be made an order of court, if the matter has 
served before court. The Act thus makes provision for the early settlement of litigation 
but fails to guard against the two inherent risks accompanying settlements. It is prudent 
to mention that the Act does not prevent a defendant from entering into a contingency 
fee agreement; on the contrary, in practice it is the plaintiffs who often enter into such 
agreements.512 
Section 5 provides that clients may review the contingency fee agreement or the fees 
through the professional controlling body if the provisions of the agreement or the fee 
is unreasonable or unjust. No rules have been implemented as envisaged in terms of 
section 6. Section 7 provides that the Minister may make regulations prescribing 
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further steps to be taken for the purposes of implementing and monitoring the Act. Two 
regulations have been promulgated since the passing of the Act.513 . 
The first inherent risk is the inclination to settle rather than go to court. The section 
was adopted from the Law Reform Commission’s consultation paper,514 in which it 
was stated that: 
[A]nother argument against contingency fees is that the financial interest of lawyers in 
the outcome of litigation may adversely affect their ability to give dispassionate, 
objective and disinterested advice at all stages of the proceedings. For example 
lawyers might be inclined to avoid trial by advising their clients to accept settlement 
offers, even though an offer is lower than the judgment likely to be gained at the trial, 
in order to secure their fees and avoid the additional expense of the trial which 
depending on the nature of the agreement entered into, have to meet should the case 
becomes unsuccessful.515 
The court in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v The Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development516 also observed that it is important to bear in 
mind that by the time the case goes to court the attorney has spent thousands of 
Rands517 and has worked for a long period without debiting fees from the client. 
Naturally, by the time the trial is conducted, the attorney is eager to recover his fees 
and close the book to maximise his cash flow. 518 
It is therefore unsurprising that litigation is regularly settled. This creates a risk that the 
lawyer will settle for a lower amount than that which could be claimed if the matter had 
                                            
513  S 1(vi)(b) and 5: Determination of Professional Controlling Body and 
designation of a body published in Government Notice No. R. 546 of 23 April 1999 
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gone to court. The second risk is that the parties may agree to fees that 
overcompensate the lawyer where the matter is settled. The danger in both cases 
could be addressed by allowing flexibility regarding the fee cap so that overreaching 
can easily be detected, looking at factors such as fairness and reasonableness. This 
is not presently the case in South Africa as the Act only provides that the success fee 
must not exceed 100% of the normal fees. 
It is furthermore clear that the risk of not recouping fees from a client if the matter is 
settled is much lower than the risk of going to court. It would therefore be logical even 
to reduce the safeguard of 100% uplift fee above normal fees and the 25% cap on the 
ultimate award in the event of a settlement. 
A recent instance of overreaching by a lawyer was illustrated in Mfengwana v Road 
Accident Fund (hereinafter Mfengwana519 which was tried in the Grahamstown High 
Court. In this case, the plaintiff’s attorney failed to comply with the Contingency Fees 
Act, specifically sections 2(1)(a), 2(2) and 4. There were apparent problems regarding 
the contingency fee contract itself and no affidavits from the attorney or the client were 
filed with the court. The judge commented that “strict compliance with the Act is 
necessary to prevent abuses on the part of the unscrupulous legal practitioners willing 
to take advantage of their clients – a phenomenon that is, in my experience, 
unfortunately all too common”.520 
The judge arranged for the Mfengwana judgment to be sent to the Cape Law Society 
so that it “as custodian of the ethical standards of the profession in the public interest, 
may consider ways and means of stopping the rot”.521 In Mfengwana, Rubushe (the 
plaintiff’s attorney) charged 25% of R900 000 damages awarded or, to be precise, 
R226 222.30.522 However, the particulars of claim were just four pages long, with one 
page taken up by the contract details.523 The plea itself was also just four pages, and 
again the fourth page consisted of just the formal details of the parties.524  
                                            
519   2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG). 
520   Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) 450. 
521   Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) 454. 
522  Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) 451. 
523  Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) 450. 
524  Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) 450. 
88 
 
The court held that it is evident from the quality of work performed, as illustrated by 
the odd and inadequate particulars of claim, that the fee charged was grossly 
disproportionate and amounted to overreaching.525 The attorney charged more than 
double the normal fee in violation of sections 2(1)(a) and 2(2) of the Act. Based on the 
quality of work the attorney would have been entitled to far less than 25% of the award. 
This case is akin to the case of Motswai v Road Accident Fund526 where the court a 
quo condemned the conduct of “predatory” administrators, attorneys, advocates and 
medico-legal experts, all of whom the court accused of being “enriched” to the 
detriment of accident victims and taxpayers.527 This contention remains true even 
though the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the judgment by Satchwell J. 
The problems picked up by the courts  include overreaching, the inadequacy of the 
court in overseeing some of these abuses, and the percentage cap requirements of 
the Act call for a more robust reform of contingency fee agreements. These reforms 
will be discussed below after a broad comparison of both contingency fee agreements 
and third-party litigation funding agreements.  
4.5  Comparison  
4.5.1 South Africa and England (third-party litigation funding agreements by non-
lawyers)528 
It is not surprising that South Africa is strongly influenced by English law and that there 
are many similarities between the two jurisdictions in the way in which third-party 
litigation funding agreements are dealt with. Public policy regarding third-party funding 
agreements in South Africa (invalid unless it was concluded in good faith) in similar to 
that in  England (invalid if the agreement was concluded  with an improper motive. 
However, in both these countries the courts have been progressive, although the 
progress has been gradual, in developing mechanisms to solve third-party litigation 
funding agreement problems as they come to the courts. Research has established 
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that reliance on the court’s discretion is not enough to regulate the third-party funding 
environment. 
The courts in both South Africa and England have consistently been antagonistically 
opposed to third-party litigation funding agreements and have considered them to be 
against public policy.529 In the event, the legislature decided to legitimise these 
agreements indirectly by introducing what in England is the conditional fee agreement 
and in South Africa is a duplicate by the name of the contingency fee agreement. These 
were attempts to further implement the principle of access to justice and they led to the 
acceptance of third-party litigation funding agreements. 
In both England and South Africa, a litigation funder other than a “pure funder” in 
certain circumstances can be joined as a co-litigant in the litigation in order to be able 
to make a costs order against such funder. This is a development that minimises the 
risk of abuse of the justice system in both countries. In South Africa this this has been 
effected in recent case such as Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd,530 EP 
Property Projects (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town,531 Scholtz v 
Merryweather,532 and Gold Fields Ltd v Motley Rice LLC.533 
The English law position can be established through a consideration of the findings of 
the research conducted by Lord Jackson in his review of civil litigation costs.534 In 
concluding his research Lord Jackson noted that the regulation of third-party funding 
agreements was insufficient and that there were few players in the funding industry.535 
This led to the creation of a self-regulated organisation called the Association of 
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Litigation Funders. This organisation provides guidelines on how to finance litigation 
through its Code of Conduct,536 which is not legislation per se but provides clarity on 
agreements of this kind. 
In English law, however, third-party litigation funding agreements by non-lawyers are 
not entirely unregulated. The Courts and Legal Services Act537 allows third-party 
litigation agreements and includes the definition of a funder. The Act also provides 
conditions applicable to the funding agreements and requires the approval of the 
Secretary of State or a prescribed person for funders. Key among these conditions is 
that the funding agreement must be in writing.538 Section 58B of the Courts and Legal 
Services Act empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations after consulting with 
judges, the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society, and other appropriate bodies. 
The regulations have not been implemented yet. Thus, there is still a vacuum in the 
proper regulation of third-party litigation funding in English law. In English law the 
litigation-funding environment is still largely self-regulated by the Code of Conduct of 
the Association of Litigation Funders, 2016. 
The perception in both these countries is that third-party litigation funding is “nascent” 
and as such it does not need to be legislated. This opinion is shared largely by litigation 
funders themselves. They argue that parties who use third-party litigation funding are 
generally commercial or similar enterprises with access to full legal advice.539 This 
argument does not highlight the historical context under which litigation funders have 
been operating. Third-party litigation funding has been an issue since the time of 
Rabin540 and Winfield.541 However, it is being treated as a new phenomenon by the 
courts and other proponents of a free-regulation industry that operates outside the 
equity of the law. 
The large number of cases discussed in both South Africa and England that deal with 
third-party litigation funding agreements is an indication of the view that these 
agreements are not new and that they create problems when they are not regulated. 
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The recommendations that will be discussed in the chapter below will provide clarity 
on regulating third-party litigation funding agreements. What follows is a discussion of 
a subspecies of third-party litigation funding agreements operating in South Africa and 
Canada with regard to lawyers. 
4.5.2 South Africa and Canada (contingency fee agreements)  
In the province of Ontario, Canada, the evolution of contingency fee agreements is 
similar to that in South Africa. The English common law was a major influence in the 
prohibition of contingency fee agreements. The acceptance of contingency fee 
agreements in both countries came after England introduced the conditional fee 
agreement. 
In South Africa the Contingency Fees Act is based on section 58 of the English Courts 
and Legal Services Act.542 In this regard Druker remarks:543  
The conditional fee bears a strong resemblance to the South African contingency fee. 
In a sense they are more or less the same even insofar as the 100% uplift (“success 
fee”) is concerned and the 25% limit. It would seem that those who drafted the 
Contingency Fees Act bent over backwards to distance themselves from anything too 
close to the American model and thus our contingency fees in South Africa are, for all 
practical purposes, the equivalent of the conditional fee in England. 
This section has been superseded by the Access to Justice Act 1999. The South 
African Act (like the English Access to Justice Act 1999) provides that contingency fee 
arrangements are lawful in all cases except criminal work, matrimonial disputes and 
cases involving disputes over children.544 This is not very different from the position in 
the Canadian province of Ontario. 
Ontario introduced contingency fee agreements through section 28.1 of the Solicitors 
Act.545 This act does not allow the agreements to be concluded in family law matters 
and criminal law proceedings.  
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However, in most Canadian provinces except Ontario certain family law disputes are 
allowed provided that the court approves.546 In Canada, attorneys in the provinces 
have a sliding scale of contingency fees, starting with lower fees if the case is resolved 
by a specific time and increasing if the case goes to trial, thus providing wider 
protection against abuse.547 
The two countries further mandate that the agreement must be in writing for it to be 
enforceable. 
In South Africa the Act provides for a maximum percentage that a lawyer is permitted 
to charge a client based on the fee agreement. In contrast Ontario does not have such 
a restriction. In Ontario a larger amount is permissible where the action is complex or 
expensive, or there is a greater risk in the case. 548 The agreement in Ontario does not 
include costs except with the court’s leave, whereas in South Africa the agreement 
may include costs. 
In Ontario, section 5 of Regulation 195/04 protects persons under disability who are 
represented by a “litigation guardian” by requiring that the legal practitioner and the 
guardian apply to court for approval of the contingency fee agreement before it is 
finalised. In this case the court plays a bigger role than in any other contingency fee 
agreement as approval is required before the case serves before the court. 
Most of the advantages of contingency fee agreements discussed under the section 
on Ontario apply mutalis mutandis to those in South Africa.549 The difference is that 
Ontario provides for flexibility when it comes to the percentage a lawyer may charge 
for a case under contingency fee agreement. There is no prescribed limit for lawyers 
regarding the percentage fees which they can charge their clients The only limitation 
is that the fee must be fair and reasonable in the circumstances. However, as indicated 
above, the South African Act took over the wording of the English statute verbatim 
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even to the point where the limitations on the percentage that a lawyer can charge are 
the same. 
 
The similarities and differences between South Africa and the Canadian province of 
Ontario as highlighted above make it clear that there is room for reform regarding 
contingency fee agreements. The recommendations provided below could help to 
bring about developments in contingency fee agreements and third-party litigation 
funding agreements. 
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1  Reform of non-lawyer litigation funding agreements550  
In view of the problems facing litigation funding agreements it is imperative to consider 
statutory regulation instead of relying on self-regulation as in England. The industry 
has outgrown self-regulation as this form of regulation is only binding on members of 
the association of funders and non-members have no obligation to abide by the self-
regulation. Third-party litigation funding has already reached the critical point 
referenced in the Jackson Report of 2009:551 a point where regulation is necessary. If 
left ungoverned, South African third-party litigation funding, like its counterpart in 
England, will constitute a risk to the market and to litigation.552  
To provide access to justice and minimise injustice to litigants, the legislator must find 
a means to regulate third-party litigation funding properly. This is also in line with the 
principle of Ubuntu in the light of transformative constitutionalism in South Africa. A 
further aim is to meet the need for general fairness and to accord with the “restorative” 
spirit of the South African Bill of Rights. There is no doubt that third-party litigation 
agreements have to be strictly regulated as a matter of fairness to avoid the 
disproportionate charging of litigants. Although this dissertation does not intend to 
provide a blueprint to be followed in drafting a solution, it shows the need to regulate 
third-party litigation funding agreements. 
The recommendations that apply in South Africa are as follows:553 
 The South African jurisdiction can utilise the Consumer Protection Act554 or the 
National Credit Act555 in addressing issues with regard to third-party litigation 
funding agreements, or introduce separate legislation. A schedule to the National 
Credit Act could be added in order to regulate third-party litigation funding 
agreements. The rationale behind this recommendation is that third-party 
litigation funding agreements are sui generis, but have some characteristics of 
agreements regulated by the National Credit Act. This is so because third-party 
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litigation funding agreements are concluded on the basis that should a litigant 
become successful in the litigation, the third-party litigation funder will be entitled 
to his disbursements and a risk fee or interest calculated as a percentage. This 
form of credit advanced to a litigant should be within the control of the National 
Credit Act, because the agreement has the potential to contain abusive and/or 
unfair provisions which are unjustifiably harsh on the litigant to the extent that a 
successful litigant might end up with much less money than in the event of failure. 
A national regulatory scheme for litigation funding agreements should also 
require that litigants disclose the source of their funding so as to allow opponents 
to defend their cases adequately. The purpose of this is to grant the defendant 
an opportunity to know who is guiding the litigation strategy and taking the 
decisions on the other side (as it is naïve to assume that funders will not take 
control of litigation where they have invested funds). Contracts of this nature are 
usually secret, making it unfairly difficult to mount an adequate defence. 
Disclosure requirements would solve this problem.556 The court rules should 
require disclosure to all parties involved in the litigation of the means by which 
the litigation is being funded at the outset of the litigation proceedings, as 
recommended by the Institute for Legal Reform and the Scotland review.557 
 The provisions regulating third-party litigation funding should protect litigants who 
have inadequate income, are illiterate, and have little bargaining power, as well 
as small businesses, as they are susceptible to abuse by third-party funders. The 
criteria for equity,558 fairness and reasonableness (the principles of Ubuntu) for 
both the litigant and the funder should be addressed by the regulatory scheme 
in the National Credit Act. The schedule should take into account the socio-
economic circumstances of South African litigants as consumers. 
 The regulations should also address concerns about new entrants to the market 
developing business practices which bring the industry into disrepute or increase 
the potential for harm or loss to be caused to claimants. Compelling funders to 
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register at a selected government agency such as the National Credit Regulator 
could achieve this. The agency would then oversee their operations and review 
some of the unethical behaviours associated with third-party funding and non- 
compliant funders. This would strengthen accountability for the funders and 
provide litigants with a less expensive and more efficient way of addressing 
issues regarding the ethics of funders.  
 The regulation of third-party funding should be comprehensive and should cover 
not just the relationship between the lawyer-funder and the client, but also the 
integrity of funding agreements.559 
 The regulation should oblige lawyers to advise clients who cannot fund their 
litigation to apply for third-party funding in addition to other funding options. The 
lawyer should also advise litigants on the implications of sourcing a litigation 
funder. The kinds of litigation that are eligible for funding should be clearly 
outlined.  
 The legislation should be structured along the lines of the English Code of 
Conduct for Litigation Funders88 but it should be pertinent to the South African 
context. The preamble should emphasise the importance of the right to access 
justice and should also indicate the necessity of prosecuting meritorious claims 
by funders. 
 The legislature should incentivise funders to provide funding to a wide variety of 
claims and not only commercial claims. This expansion of the possibility of 
litigation by litigation funders is also contemplated by Lord Justice Rupert 
Jackson in his report, when he states that "if the use of third-party funding 
expands, then full statutory regulation may well be required, as envisaged by the 
Law Society”.560 Funders should also be encouraged to fund personal injury 
cases, so that in addition to contingency fee agreements, litigants can have the 
option of having their litigation funded by litigation funders. The funders should 
be restricted in the amount of success fees561 they may be entitled to, depending 
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on the type of cases undertaken. There should be guidelines on the complexity 
and risk taken by funders in a case, as these will affect the success fee. 
 In addition, the legislature should state clearly that the funder will be liable to pay 
adverse costs should the litigation fail. Although this requirement is contemplated 
by the courts in South Africa to afford more protection to the litigant, it should be 
one of the consequences that the litigant cannot waive. 
In view of the overwhelming criticism of the English Code of Conduct for Litigation 
Funders,562 it would be prudent for South Africa to regulate third-party litigation funding 
agreements to avoid abuse – especially by new funders emerging with own practices 
that may result in the exploitation of litigants. The above recommendations could 
contribute to the provision of guiding legislation that will enable both litigants and 
funders to operate fairly in dealings with each other. The regulation of third-party 
agreements would not only provide the courts with oversight as in the case of 
contingency fee agreements, but would also foster transparency and prevent the 
overcharging of clients.563 The above recommendations can help to provide guiding 
legislation that will enable both litigants and funders to operate fairly in their dealings 
with each other. The recommendations discussed below apply to contingency fee 
agreements in South Africa. 
5.2  Reform of lawyer contingency fee agreements  
Firstly, in determining the appropriate percentage, the courts in South Africa should 
remove the problematic threshold of 25% and replace it with considerations considered 
by Smith J in Re Cogan564 such as: 
a) financial risk assumed by the lawyer, included under likelihood of success, the nature 
and complexity of the claim, and the expense and risk of pursuing it: b) the result 
achieved and the amount recovered; c) the expectations of the party; d) who is to 
receive an award for costs, and e) achievement of the social objective of providing 
access to justice for injured parties, including injured children and parties under 
disability…  
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This method is available to clients and lawyers in Ontario under the commentary in the 
Law Society's Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 2.08(3). The ultimate test for the 
court would be whether the fee is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. 
Secondly, both Ontario and South Africa should revisit the ban on family law matters 
by looking into developments in British Columbia, one of the oldest provinces in 
Canada to have allowed contingency fee agreements. This will provide access to 
justice to those litigants who in the absence of contingency fee agreements would 
otherwise not be able to bring a case with merits before the courts. The court can play 
a role by approving these agreements from the inception when it comes to matrimonial 
matters. The cap on fees in family law matters will have to be low in order to avoid 
exhausting family savings, to lessen spousal strife and to lay to rest other fears 
associated with allowing contingency fee agreements.565 
The main cap introduced by the Contingency Fees Act is far too inflexible because it 
sets a single threshold for the maximum contingency fee, which applies to all types of 
cases.566 The fairness and reasonableness of the fee structure should be a matter 
within the discretion of the court.  
The practice of predetermining the success fee always gives rise to unfair results: the 
attorney may underestimate the case and perhaps uplift his normal fees by 40% where 
the quality of work done afterwards and the risk assumed might well deserve a 100% 
uplift. Conversely, a pre-agreed percentage increase of 100% may be unfair to the 
client where the quality of work done by the legal practitioner is poor. This could be 
remedied by allowing a legal practitioner and his client to agree on the fee increment 
or a fee adjustment after the case. However, the predetermined percentage would still 
be considered. This would also reinforce the provision that requires a reduction of the 
fee increment in the event of partial success. These developments may strengthen 
access to justice as the most important public policy principle applicable to contingency 
fee agreements. The discussion of both lawyers and non-lawyers’ agreements when it 
comes to third-party litigation funding agreements will be wound up with the following 
conclusion. 
                                            
565   Carville 2015 http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/05/31/lawyers-fight-archaic-ban-on-no-
win-no-fee-arrangements-in-family-court.html.  
566  SAAPIL case 118. 
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5.3  Conclusion 
It is now evident that the history of both third-party litigation funding agreements and 
contingency fee agreements is interrelated. Both of these kinds of agreements were 
prohibited in countries that were influenced by the English common law. It is also 
evident that in the number of litigation funding agreements by non-lawyers is increasing 
and the study has shown that the growing number of third-party litigation funders poses 
problems for the courts. Having considered the earlier and more recent research 
conducted on the subject, this study has shown in the recommendations section that 
it would be beneficial to regulate third-party litigation funding The study has also 
highlighted the fact that new mechanisms fostering access to justice have proved to 
be useful. However, they should be looked at with particular care as they also pose 
potential risks if not properly regulated. Considering the rise in the number of reported 
cases, it is clear that funding for meritorious cases is in demand, and this situation may 
give rise to abuse. 
The research shows that relevant legislation should provide guidelines on how to deal 
with cases where the identity of funders is not disclosed, and how to ensure fairness 
in the levying of funders’ fees. The element of the control of litigation by the funder 
should be regulated. This regulation should benefit both the funder and the litigant with 
regard to the control of the litigation. Disclosing the involvement of a third-party funder 
to the other party to the litigation would change the dynamics of the litigation and in 
most cases balance the scales with regard to access to justice. There should be an 
incentive for funders to fund the meritorious claims of individuals who are unable to 
access justice due to monetary constraints, and the funding of litigation should 
therefore not be limited to commercial cases. 
This study indicates the need for the courts and the legislature to find solutions beyond 
those recommended to properly limit the effects of third-party litigation funding 
agreements. As indicated, a good starting point would be to look at third-party litigation 
funding agreements in English law. England is the only country that currently has a 
mechanism to regulate third-party litigation funding agreements, although the system 
is not without flaws. It is also concluded that third-party litigation funding should be fully 
regulated by legislation to protect the interests of litigants and defendants. The 
proposed legislation could resemble the Code of Conduct of the Association of 
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Litigation Funders in England. The legislation should provide measures that include 
but are not limited to transparency in litigation funding agreements. Third-party 
litigation funding and its subspecies, contingency fee agreements, have developed and 
are strengthening the right of many litigants to have their disputes adjudicated by the 
courts. It is suggested that there should be further research by the Reform Commission 
on the area of third-party litigation funding. This could be done by drawing comparisons 
with countries that are contemplating legislating third-party litigation funding in order to 
implement better measures and further the public policy on access to justice.  
In this study, when looking at the developments of both non-lawyer litigation funders 
and lawyers’ contingency fee agreements, it was found that they both provide litigants 
with the means to pursue meritorious cases that would have been impossible to pursue 
if the prohibitions against these agreements were still in place. This study has further 
determined that both mechanisms fostering access to justice have proved to be useful 
but they should be carefully scrutinised as they also pose hardships if not properly 
regulated. It appears from the rise in litigation reflected in the reports that these 
mechanisms for funding meritorious cases are in demand and as such they are open 
to abuse. 
The study has shown that the courts and the legislators must find means above those 
that are recommended in this study to properly limit the effects of both these kinds of 
agreements. As indicated in this study, a good starting point when embarking on the 
reform of third-party litigation funding agreements is to look at the developments in 
England. This is corroborated by the fact that England is the only country as of late that 
has a mechanism for regulating third-party litigation funding agreements, although it 
has its shortfalls. The study further indicates that South Africa could also adopt working 
practices from Ontario as indicated above regarding contingency fee agreements. This 
would allow the courts to oversee some detrimental agreements concluded on behalf 
of vulnerable members of society. The other development would be to allow the funding 
of some matrimonial cases by contingency fee agreements provided that the court first 
approve such funding. Third-party litigation funding and its subspecies, contingency 
fee agreements, have developed and are strengthening the right of many litigants to 
have their disputes adjudicated by the courts. The doors for access to justice have 
been opened and lack of funding is no longer a barrier to engaging in litigation. 
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